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ABSTRACT MONTEREY CA 93943-5101
Germany and the United States differ in their approach to Iran. While the United
States seeks to contain Iran through diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions,
Germany prefers to influence Iran though diplomatic engagement and economic
cooperation.
German foreign policy posits that its policy of constructive engagement is the most
effective way to influence another country's behavior. This notion has its origins in the
Cold War. In 1963, the idea of a "policy of small steps" leading to "change through
rapprochement" inspired the policy of Ostpolitik. The basic principles of Ostpolitik were
continued from 1 969 through the end of the Cold War. It is widely believed in Germany
that the end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany were due not to the success
of containment, but to detente and Ostpolitik.
Given this policy perspective, Germany considers the political and economic costs
of sanctions to be unacceptably high. In addition to the loss to commercial interests,
sanctions would affect Germany's overall credibility as a trading state. Moreover, political
demands which might be suspect because of Germany's past are translated into more
respectable economic demands. Economic sanctions would limit Germany's ability to
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Germany and the United States differ in their approach to Iran. While the United
States seeks to contain Iran through diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions,
Germany prefers to influence Iran through diplomatic engagement and economic
cooperation.
The Federal Republic's preference for constructive engagement can be traced to its
policies of the Cold War. The concept of "change through rapprochement" as an
alternative to the Hallstein Doctrine and containment led to Chancellor Willy Brandt's
policy of Ostpolitik after 1969. While Americans wanted to limit Eastern bloc access to
Western technology, to reduce Western dependence on energy resources from the East, to
restrict the availability of export credits, and to impose sanctions when deemed necessary
for leverage with the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic primarily utilized economic
policies for the pursuit of a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Trade was a
fundamental component of Ostpolitik and it made the Federal Republic the biggest trading
partner with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This policy, based on the use of
positive inducements to promote change in the East, was practiced in various forms until
the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Consequently, many Germans attribute the end of the
Cold War and the reunification of Germany to the success of detente and Ostpolitik.
Given the view that these policies were so successful, the Federal Republic has applied the
same concepts in its extra-European foreign policy.
Germany considers the political and economic costs of sanctions to be
unacceptably high. Preferring "quiet diplomacy" and lacking the traditional political-
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military structure of other powers, Germany favors economics as the means to attain its
political objectives. Sanctions would damage German credibility as a trading partner, a
significant factor in a country where 30 percent of the economy is devoted to exports,
compared to 10 percent in the United States. This fact means that Germany must make
sure its export markets remain open and available to maintain its economy and possibly its
political stability. The country is therefore one of the strongest proponents of free trade.
To protect its markets, Germany must demonstrate the reliability of its products as well as
their delivery. In the past, German business has done well in Iran because of its
willingness to stay when the firms of other countries have left the market. Clearly, for
Germany, the cost of its participation in economic sanctions would be a loss of economic
and political influence.
During the 1990s, Iran has served as a test case for the Federal Republic's
constructive engagement policy. In December 1992, the European Union's adoption of
"critical dialogue" followed the release in the previous June of the last German hostages
from Lebanon. Iran's role in securing their release was seen as proof that relations could
be beneficial even if the Salman Rushdie affair remained unresolved. The opportunity to
negotiate for the release of German citizens held in Iran was seen as an additional benefit.
However, the ongoing Mykonos investigation and trial, official Iranian comments
regarding Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination and terrorist activity in
Israel, followed by the German issuance of an arrest warrant for the Iranian Minister of
Information and Security, Ali Fallahian, led to a deterioration of relations. Despite an
increased willingness to criticize Iran, a modification of German policy was inevitable even
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before the April 1997 Mykonos verdict. Nevertheless, as events after the suspension of
"critical dialogue" demonstrate, Germany continues to adhere to the principles of
constructive engagement.
The Federal Republic sees economic sanctions as futile. It will only participate in
sanctions if the United Nations imposes them. Consequently, the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act will not succeed in coercing Germany into sanctions. While the United States remains
the Federal Republic's primary strategic partner, the United States can no longer link
issues to security to the extent that it did during the Cold War. Furthermore, Germany
sees itself being asked to make a greater sacrifice than the United States is willing to pay.
While Germany has a different policy for dealing with Iran, it does have the same
objectives: to stop Iran from supporting terrorism and disrupting the Middle East peace
process and to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The fact that
American and German policy objectives towards Iran are so similar offers a starting point
for coordination. Recent events have created an opportunity to find common ground in
dealing with Iran. By coordinating policy efforts, the United States and Germany would
have more leverage for dealing with Tehran. The alternative is to risk further divergence




The Federal Republic of Germany's relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran
has been viewed with concern in the United States. While the United States seeks to
contain Iran through diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions, Germany has sought to
influence Iran through diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation. This policy of
constructive engagement—called "critical dialogue"—was first adopted by the European
Union (EU) with strong German backing at the Edinburgh summit in December 1992. Its
objectives were to pressure Iran to support the Middle East peace process, implement a
commitment made to the EU not to sponsor terrorism in the Middle East, improve human
rights, and halt covert activities that threaten Iranians living abroad.
Germany, along with its EU partners, maintained the policy of "critical dialogue"
with Iran until April 1997. At that time, the EU suspended the policy and recalled their
ambassadors from Tehran following a Berlin court verdict. That verdict was that senior
Iranian government officials had authorized the assassination of three Iranian Kurdish
dissidents and their translator at the Berlin restaurant Mykonos in September 1992.
The policy of "critical dialogue," remains officially suspended. Nevertheless,
German relations with Iran have not changed significantly. EU ambassadors, including
German ambassador Horst Baechmann, returned to Tehran in November 1997. German
officials, including Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, have
opposed such stronger measures as the implementation of sanctions. No governing
coalition or major opposition party has supported a break in ties. The German
1
ambassador may have been away from Tehran for seven months, however, German
companies continued business as usual. 1
A. OSTPOLITIK BEYOND EUROPE
Why has Germany continued to pursue high-level diplomatic and trade relations
with Iran—despite repeated violations of the internationally-recognized norms of
acceptable behavior, and pressure from allies, human rights organizations, and dissident
groups to reduce cooperation?
This study suggests that Germany has maintained relations with Iran for two
primary reasons. First, from the German foreign policy perspective, sanctions are not
considered as effective as cooperation and engagement for influencing another country's
actions. In Germany, there is a widely held belief that trade contributes to reducing
international tensions. According to former President Richard von Weizsacker: "Free
trade is not just the consequence of detente, it is a confidence-building measure in itself"2
Many Germans attribute the end of the Cold War not to the success of containment, but
rather to detente and Ostpolitik} Consequently, German foreign policy operates under
1
"Iran and the West: Hate Me, Love My Gas," The Economist, 4 October 1997, pp. 50-51.
2 Richard von Weizsacker, Eroffnung des Weltwirtschafts-Forum in Berlin am 24.10.1986, in: Reden und
Interviews (3), Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 1988, p. 200. Cited in Lothar
Gutjahr, German Foreign and Defense Policy After Unification, London and New York: Pinter
Publishers, 1994, p. 65.
3 Peter Rudolf, "Managing Strategic Divergence: German-American Conflict Over Policy Towards Iran,"
The Iranian Dilemma: Challengesfor German andAmerican Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1997, p. 3.
the philosophy that trade and diplomacy offer the best hope for moderating the regime in
Tehran.
Second, the Germans consider the economic and political costs associated with
sanctions to be unbearably high. Although Iran ranks low as a market for German
exports, the imposition of sanctions would affect Germany's overall credibility as a
"Trading State."4 Moreover, sanctions increase the long-term uncertainty, and therefore
the cost, of doing business abroad. All trading partners of Germany, not just Iran, might
be prompted to diversify their sources of supply and seek alternative partners for joint
ventures and technologies not developed in Germany.
The late Wolfram Hanrieder described Germany as an economic superpower
without the component traditional military-strategic power. He said the distinctions
between politics and economics, and between domestic and foreign policy, have been
more fluid in Germany than in other countries. Economics is the vehicle used by Germans
to attain their political objectives. Political demands, which might be suspect because of
Germany's past, are translated into more respectable economic demands. 5 Economic
sanctions therefore threaten to limit Germany's ability to pursue its political objectives.
Numerous interrelated factors influence German policy towards Iran. German
relations with Iran are shaped by: (a) the historical ties between both countries over the
past century; (b) German foreign and security policy objectives, including its relationship
4
Ibid., p. 2.
5 Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years ofGerman Foreign Policy, New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 224.
to the Mediterranean, Near East, and Central Asia; (c) German domestic politics; (d) the
political and economic importance of Germany to Iran, including Iran's need for Western
technology and capital; (e) Germany's special relationship with Israel; (f) Germany's
relationship with the United States; and (g) Germany's own experience of the Cold War
—
that diplomacy and trade are the keys to moderating an authoritarian regime.
B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The Clinton Administration designed a policy called "dual containment" in 1993 to
exert economic and political influence on Iran and Iraq. In 1995, the administration and
Congress began increasing efforts to isolate Iran. New legislation passed in that year
called for a total ban on all trade between Iran and the United States. Further, the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act, signed by President Clinton in August 1996, sanctions foreign
companies if they invest $20 million (the limit was lowered from $40 million in August
1997) or more in the energy sectors of Iran or Libya. As a result, Iran's trading partners
have strongly opposed the act as an unjustifiable attempt to coerce them into following
American policy. Germany and other EU members have protested the extra-territorial
legislation as illegal. 6 Because Germany and the other EU nations do not participate, the
sanctions remain fragile and easy for Iran to circumvent.
" Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmed S. Hashim, Iran: Dilemmas ofDual Containment, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1997, p. 15.
C. SANCTIONS AND COOPERATION
Sanctions are an element of international diplomacy, a tool for coercing a
government into a particular avenue of response. Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and
Kimberly Elliott use the term "sender" to designate the country (or international
organization) that is the principal author of the sanctions episode. 7 The term "target" is
used to designate the country that is the immediate object of the episode. More than one
country may be engaged in the campaign, but usually a single country takes the lead and
brings others along. The leader may enlist support through bilateral consultations or, less
frequently, through an international organization. Lisa Martin defines "cooperation" as
any joint activity among states. A country which takes the leadership role among the
senders is called the "leading sender."8
According to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, there are three main ways a sender
tries to inflict costs on its target: by limiting exports, by restricting imports, and by
impeding finance, including the reduction of aid. Trade sanctions engender costs to the
target country in terms of lost export markets, denial of critical imports, lower prices
received for embargoed exports, and higher prices paid for substitute imports. 9 Because
economic sanctions impose costs (both on the states that employ them and on their
' Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:
History and Current Policy, 2d Ed., Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990, pp. 35-
36.
° Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 10.
" Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, p. 36.
targets), governments use them to signal resolve and exert pressure for policy changes.
Although the goals of sanctions are highly political, states' ability to use sanctions is
subject to the rules of economic exchange. This means that unilateral sanctions—those
undertaken by just one government—usually fail because the target can find alternative
markets or suppliers for the sanctioned goods. 10 Consequently, the United States, with an
interest in using economic sanctions, faces the problem of gaining the cooperation of
others countries such as Germany. Efforts will not succeed without cooperation.
According to Martin, coercion occurs when states have asymmetrical interests. 11
In the bilateral sanctions model, it becomes a possibility when the equilibrium outcome is
for only one state to impose sanctions. Under these conditions, it will be in that state's
interest to attempt to get cooperation from the other through promises, threats, linkage, or
whatever techniques are available and cost-effective.
The major sender—the state that is going to impose sanctions regardless of the
activities of others—has to persuade other potential sanctioners to cooperate. The major
sender must link the sanctions issue to other issues in which it has the power to persuade
others. Ability to persuade, or coerce, is based on two factors: sufficient resources to
change other potential sanctioners' incentives and willingness to use those resources.
Martin postulates that two variables—the United State's declining hegemony and the costs
™ Martin, pp. 3-4.
11
Ibid. p. 27.
of sanctions to the major sender—effect these two dimensions of coercion. 12 In general,
more powerful states should have more resources for this purpose than weaker states. In
the early postwar period, the United States frequently was able to gain the cooperation of
Germany and other European countries without even asking. Dependence on the United
States for security and economic reasons caused these countries to follow its lead
"automatically" on most issues, including economic sanctions. As its power declined
relative to Germany's, the United States more frequently had to make explicit threats and
linkages in order to gain cooperation. 13 If this argument is correct, in cases where the
United States is the major sender, explicit threats for cooperation—the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act—have ceased to be persuasive.
D. GERMANY AND IRAN
This study seeks to explain the goals, sources, and methods of German extra-
European foreign policy. It analyzes the motivations for, and objectives of, current
German policy towards Iran; interprets the extent of German-Iranian relations; analyzes
the effects of recent Iranian actions on German foreign policy; and finally, assesses the
potential implications of German-Iranian relations for American foreign policy. Research
was conducted using secondary sources—books, periodicals, German press articles





Chapter II documents German relations with Iran from the historical perspective.
It covers the eras of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and then
the Federal Republic. As will be shown, Germany and Iran have had generally positive
relations over the last century. Chapter III covers German foreign policy. It explores
factors which have influenced Germany's extra-European foreign and commercial policy
since the beginning of the Federal Republic. The chapter also assesses current German
domestic factors shaping the debate about relations with Iran. Chapter IV assesses the
problems faced by German foreign policy in dealing with Iran during the 1990s. It begins
with an examination of the German response to Ayatollah Khomeyni's fatwa against
Salman Rushdie and continues through the recent court verdict that resulted in the
suspension of "critical dialogue." As the chapter reveals, German-Iranian relations have
endured despite significant problems. Additionally, Germany's willingness to deal with the
regime in Tehran has often been constrained by other factors. Finally, Chapter V
concludes with an assessment of German relations with Iran and the discusses the potential
implications for the United States.
n. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Germany and Iran signed their first treaty in 1873. At this time, two years after
unification, German foreign policy remained focused on Europe. Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck sought to reassure other European powers of Germany's intentions. His
position was that Germany was a satisfied power, without further territorial ambitions, and
without a desire to challenge Great Britain, France, or Russia in the extra-European
imperial sphere. 14 Germany's role in Iran and the Near East remained insignificant until
1 898, when German imperialist activities began in earnest.
A. WELTPOLITIK AND IRAN
Bismarck's dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890 marked a turning point for
Germany and Europe. The aggressive global policy of Weltpolitik ("world politics")
replaced Germany's restrained foreign policy. The Kaiser hoped to make Germany a great
imperial power. He believed this could be achieved through increased diplomatic
influence, colonial expansion, and the development of a modern navy. Weltpolitik was
partly influenced by Germany's late, but rapid industrialization, which forced it to look
overseas for raw materials, markets for manufactured goods, outlets for accumulated
capital, and the capability to protect overseas interests.
14 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 146, and Wolfram F.
Hanrieder, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979, Bolder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 2.
Germany's relationship with Iran can be traced back to the development of
political and economic ties with the Ottoman Empire. The Kaiser proclaimed himself
protector and friend of the world's 300 million Muslims during a visit to the Ottoman
Empire in 1898. In 1899, the Germans obtained a preliminary concession from the
Ottoman Sultan to build the "Baghdad railway," which was to connect Hamburg, Berlin,
and Vienna with Baghdad and the Persian Gulf via Constantinople. The concession for
the railway was secured by Germany in 1902. A 200km section was completed in 1904. 15
Because German banks and armaments industry became more interested in Turkey, it was
no longer possible to maintain the Bismarckian policy of disinterest towards Near Eastern
affairs. 16
Germany made persistent efforts to acquire a "place in the sun" in the Persian
Gulf. 17 German trading firms established branches in Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. The
Deutsche Orient Bank negotiated for a concession in Iran until British and Russian
opposition ended it in 1907. Germany's aggressive foreign policy and naval construction
campaign added to British and Russian concerns about German competition in their
spheres of influence, leading to the Anglo-Russian Agreement in 1907. This followed the
15 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941: A Developing Nation in World
Affairs, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1966, p. 89.
16 Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 2.
17 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 117.
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Anglo-French Entente Cordiale in 1904. In combination, these agreements effected a
radical transformation of the European balance into two rival groups of powers. 18
The Russo-German Potsdam Agreement concluded in 1911 resulted in Russia's
formal agreement not to obstruct the Baghdad railway, while Germany admitted Russia's
special interests in Iran. However, Britain continued to fear that German control of the
proposed line would give Germany financial and political influence in Iran. A German
presence in Iran threatened India and the approaches to the subcontinent more than even
Russia. 19 A Turkish army under German officers with the use of a railway to Tehran
would be a danger.20 Great Britain, in its effort to maintain naval supremacy over
Germany, had sought a qualitative improvement in its fleet by changing from coal to oil
for fueling. Southern Iran, where most British oil came from, acquired additional strategic
value. 21 Britain's need to secure its position in southern Iran and the Persian Gulf and
Germany's need for capital to complete the "Baghdad Railway" led to negotiations.
However, two months after an Anglo-German railway agreement was concluded (and the
railway itself was still hundreds of miles from Baghdad) war broke out in Europe. 22
*° Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems ofOur Time,
3d Ed., New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 35-37.
19 Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy From Bismarck to Adenauer: The Limits ofStatecraft,
London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 94.
20 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, 1966, p. 107.
21 Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy 1871-1914, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1976, pp. 155-156.
22 James Joll, The Origins ofthe First World War, 2d Ed., London and New York: Longman, 1992, pp.
187-188.
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German activities in the Middle East were intensified following the outbreak of the
First World War. Of the two Muslim states dominating the region, the Ottoman Turks
allied with Germany and Austria, but Iran declared itself neutral. Consequently, the
German objective in Iran was twofold: first, to impel Iran to follow the lead of Berlin and
Vienna and, second, to divert British and Russian energies away from the main theater of
war in Europe by creating or intensifying anti-Entente sentiments and activities. The
Iranian mood was favorable to German designs. 23
Germany worked through diplomatic and military channels to influence the Iranian
government. The staff at the German embassy in Tehran, led by the minister, Prince
Henry XXXI de Reuss, established close contact with members of the cabinet of Prime
Minister Mustawfi al-Mamalik. 24 Additionally, conscious of the pro-German feelings
among the prospective deputies of the Majlis (parliament), German diplomats worked to
influence the Democrats and the Moderates to put aside their differences and form a
coalition, with the ultimate aim of winning the cabinet to the cause of the Central Powers
and the abandonment of neutrality.25
Several German military missions dispatched to Iran after the German military
attache in Tehran, Count Kanitz, conducted an extensive reconnaissance of the provinces.
One mission operated in southern Iran, extending its activities to Kerman and Isfahan.
23 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 118.
24 Ibid, pp. 118-119.
25 Ibid, p. 119.
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Another mission was active in Kermanshah and the surrounding areas. German agents
exploited anti-British sentiments to foment uprisings among the Qashqa'i and Bakhtyari
tribes in southwestern Iran. German military activities in Iran were masterminded in Berlin
with the assistance of Iranian nationalists who had formed the Iranian Committee for
Cooperation with Germany. 26 Prime Minister Mustawfi al-Mamalik was eventually
persuaded to negotiate an agreement with Germany. 27
When the British and Russians learned of secret negotiations, however, they
warned the Iranian government against any pro-German action. Russia dispatched
additional troops to Iran from the Caucasus. Prime Minister Mustawfi al-Mamalik
resigned in December 1915. 28 His successor, Prince Farmanfarma, clamped down on pro-
German elements in Iran. Iranian foreign policy generally favored the Allies through the
remainder of the war.
B. THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC, THE THIRD REICH, AND IRAN
Germany's defeat by the Allies in the First World War resulted in a rapid decline in
interest and influence outside Europe. The collapse of the Second German Reich and the
foundation of the Weimar Republic ended, for the time being, the era of German
26 Ibid, pp. 119-120.
27
Ibid., p. 128.
28 Ibid, pp. 130-131.
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imperialism and caused a reversal to previous continental European orientations.29
German foreign policy avoided any expression or action which could lead to a
confrontation with the Western Powers, especially Britain. The Middle East played only a
marginal role in the policy of the Weimar Republic.
In Iran, a coup d'etat brought Reza Khan Pahlavi to power in 1921. He became
shah in 1925. The stabilization of internal conditions after the coup d'etat and a postwar
hands-off policy by Britain and Russia provided Iran with an unprecedented degree of
freedom of action in foreign affairs. This was evident in its policy towards Russia and
Britain, and in its "third power" policy.
The shah's favored third power was Germany. Despite Germany's thrust into the
Middle East in 1898, and the fact that Iran was an object of its expansionist designs,
Iranian Germanophiles remembered Germany's challenge to Iran's traditional "enemies"
—
Britain and Russia. The powerful German propaganda machine had not only exploited
Iran's resentment against these powers, but had also portrayed Germany as the "true
friend" of Islam. 30
The Weimar Republic directed most of its attention to Europe and coping with the
strictures of the Treaty of Versailles. However, in spite of a lack of political interest in the
Middle East, Germany carried on commercial relations with the area, although on a
29 Jehuda L. Wallach, "The Weimar Republic and the Middle East: Salient Points," The Great Powers in
the Middle East 1919-1939, New York and London: Holmes & Meyer Publishers, 1988, p. 271.
30 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 278.
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smaller scale than before World War I. 31 Signs of a renewal in German-Iranian economic
ties became evident as early as 1920 when representatives of German export companies
reappeared in Tehran. In 1922, Iranian students were sent to Germany, and direct
steamship service began operating between Hamburg and the Iranian port of Enzeli,
passing through the Volga and the Caspian Sea. In 1923, Germany and Iran entered
negotiations for the reopening of a German secular school in Tehran. Former German
officers were hired to organize and run arsenals in Tehran and Bushehr. The same year
witnessed the arrival of Iran's "warship," the Pahlavi, and the delivery of arms, munitions,
and army trucks, all purchased from Germany. In 1927, the German aviation firm Junkers
acquired a monopoly of the postal and passenger air services in Iran. 32 The shah's
objective was economic self-sufficiency by means of rapid industrialization and German
capital and technical expertise were sought to further that goal. German firms built
sections of the Trans-Iranian Railway, roads, and other communications projects.
The question of regulated trade between the two countries was taken up as early
as 1924. In that year, Germany's 1873 treaty with Iran expired and the German minister
in Tehran made several attempts to renew it. A treaty was eventually signed on 10 May
1928. Five days later, on 15 May 1928, Iran signed a "provisional" agreement with
Germany which extended most-favored nation treatment to German diplomatic and
consular representatives in Iran. This provisional agreement was followed by a Treaty of
31 Wallach, p. 272.
3^ Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 280.
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Friendship, signed on 17 February 1929, which could be reexamined after ten years. Still
another agreement was signed on 24 February 1930 regarding the protection of patents,
trademarks, trade names, and designs. Iran and Germany sought to extend each other's
nationals and companies in their territories the same rights as their own nationals and
companies. 33 Trade between Germany and Iran began increasing.
As part of Iran's rapprochement with Germany, Iran employed German economic
advisors. A German financial expert, under the Iranian minister of finance, advised the
Iranian government on financial obligations, on the preparation of the budget, and on
granting concessions. German financial advisors operated the National Bank of Iran. 34
The German-Iranian friendship suffered a setback in April 1932, however, when four
German journalists and an Iranian student in Berlin published defamatory articles about the
shah, who subsequently launched a campaign against Germans in Iran. The first target
was head of the Tehran arsenal. The second was president and chief organizer of the
National Bank of Iran, Dr. Hurt Lindenblatt. The shah's disenchantment with Germany
also prompted the dismissal of the Iranian finance minister. The German embassy in
Tehran had influenced the finance minister, not only to promote German economic
interests, but also for cultural and political propaganda by emphasizing the alleged
similarities between German and Iranian political ideals. 35
33 Ibid., p. 282.
34 Donald N. Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction ofIran, New York:
Exposition Press, Inc., 1975, p. 147.
35 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, pp. 287-288.
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The German policy of penetrating Iran predated the Nazis, however, the rise of
Hitler in 1933 "added only new impetus to the already existing policy."36 The Nazis saw
Iran as a key element in their strategy to isolate the Soviet Union and British India. The
persistent German interest in Iran coincided with the psychological predisposition of Iran
towards Germany. 37 The Middle East became more important for German trade. To
reduce unemployment, and secure raw materials necessary for large-scale rearmament and
eventual war, Hitler's most important economic initiatives involved promotion of exports.
The German export drive in the Middle East was directed toward Iran, Iraq, and Egypt
because of their large populations and their relative independence from Britain and France.
At the same time, imports from these countries decreased as Germany sought to achieve
self-sufficiency. In truth, the Middle East was not a prime source of raw materials for
Germany. Germany under Hitler did not need Middle East oil, the one major raw material
in the region. It preferred closer sources in the Soviet Union and Romania. Germany also
pursued greater exploitation of its domestic supply and invested heavily in the synthetic
fuel industry. 38
3° Cf L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran (London, 1944), p. 175, and George Lenczowski, Russia and the
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Part of Germany's commercial activity in the Middle East involved the sale of
weapons after it resumed those exports in 1936. 39 A consortium of German corporations
was formed to cooperate with the government in weapons sales abroad. This consortium,
known as the Reich Industrial Group: Export Cooperative for War Material
(Reichsgruppe Industrie: Ausfuhrgemeinschaft fur Kriegsgerat), consisted of Germany's
leading arms manufacturers 40 The Middle East, however, made up only a small
proportion of total weapons sales.
After 1933, the National Socialist Party's foreign organization {Auslands-
Organization or AO) began to grow in influence, develop a foreign service of its own, to
send agents abroad to spread Nazi propaganda, maintain contact with subversive elements,
and extend party discipline on German nationals 41 The foreign office continually
protested activities of the AO, but by 1937 it had jurisdiction over all Germans living
abroad. Further, Hitler made foreign policy without much reference to inputs from
diplomats. This problem was made worse by the appointment of Joachim von Ribbentrop,
who also had great contempt for the diplomats, to the position of foreign minister 42
In October 1936, Hitler ordered the promotion of close German economic ties
with Iran and Afghanistan. These were the only two countries in the region where
39 See ibid, App. 13, "German Weapons Exports to the Middle East, 1936-1939," pp. 219-221.
40 Ibid, p. 182.
41 Gordon A. Craig, From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects ofGerman Statecraft, Baltimore: Johns




Germany sought to strengthen its political influence, because direct British power and
influence were weaker there than in the Arab world.43 In late 1936, the Majlis ratified a
clearing agreement with Germany as the initial step in a series of agreements that brought
Iran and Germany into very close commercial relations. The Majlis also passed bills
providing for the employment of German teachers at the Industrial School of Tehran, to
extend the contract of the German in charge of the printing plant of the Majlis, and to hire
a German professor for Tehran University. In November 1936, the German Minister of
Economics, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, visited Iran 44
In 1939, the outbreak of war in Europe made the transit problem extremely urgent
for Iran. Transportation was then possible only by way of the Soviet Union. The shah,
unsuccessful in his efforts to reach a new economic agreement with the Soviets through
direct diplomatic channels, attempted indirect pressure through Germany. The Germans
viewed economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran as not only in the
interest of both parties, but also of German-Iranian economic plans. The less friction in
Soviet-Iranian relations, the Germans believed, the smoother the course of German-
Iranian trade. Germany supported Iranian efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet
Union.45 However, the Pact of Mutual Assistance signed between Germany and the
Soviet Union in September 1939 placed significant strains on Iranian neutrality. The
43 Nicosia, p. 183.
44 Wilbur, p. 177.
45 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-194], p. 223.
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German friendship with Iran's traditional bete noire, Russia, was resented, and the
developments in Europe at the time increased Iranian apprehensions 46
Consequently, Iran suggested joint action with Moscow to settle the question of
transit through the Soviet Union. The German role, according to Iran, should consist of a
German-Soviet agreement to solve Iran's transit problem. In a German-Soviet trade
agreement signed in February 1940, Russia promised, among other things, to "facilitate
the transport of goods to Germany from Iran."47 In October 1940, Iran and the Soviet
Union reached an agreement which provided for the transit of goods across the common
frontier without being unloaded, and which provided duty-free transit through the Soviet
Union. Later, Iran and Germany concluded an agreement to conduct their trade on a
barter basis.48
Germany surpassed the Soviet Union as Iran's number-one trading partner in
1939. The phenomenal increase in German-Iranian trade is not attributed entirely to the
policies of the Nazis or Shah Reza Khan. The most important factor was Iran's
continuing trade problem with the Soviet Union which forced the shah to turn to
Germany. In 1940-1941, Iran's German imports amounted to 48 percent of total imports,
4° Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran 's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study ofForeign Policy in Modernizing
Nations, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975, p. 26.
47 David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia 's Foreign Policy, 1939-1942, New Haven, 1943, pp. 422-423. Cited in
Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 224.
48 Wilbur, p. 199.
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and its exports to Germany were 42 percent of the total.49 Soviet-Iranian trade had
dropped to almost nothing. By substituting Germany for the Soviet Union as its primary
trade partner, the shah had finally succeeded in emancipating Iran from Russia.
Even if Iran's policy of neutrality was strained by the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement,
neutrality seemed justifiable until Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
The British and Soviets were then allied in a common cause against Germany. Iranian
neutrality was at stake because both countries opposed the presence of a large number of
Germans in Iran. Germans virtually controlled important Iranian industries, railways, and
airlines. 50 In the wake of the invasion, German activities in, and joint Soviet-British
pressures on, Iran increased while Iran persistently claimed strict neutrality. In Iran the
feeling prevailed that Germany would win the war. It was thought that Germany would
mount a successful winter drive through the Caucasus region and that the final German
victory would result in the return, to a friendly Iran, of those areas of the Caucasus and
Turkmenistan taken from Iran by Russia early in the nineteenth century. 51
In July 1941, stormtrooper auxiliary {Sturmabteilung or SA) leaders Roman
Gamotta and Franz Mayer headed an efficient Nazi party organization with branches
throughout Iran and with members strategically placed in the radio station, railway, and
other public services and commercial organizations. Germans also were installed in key
49 Ramazani, The Foreign Policy ofIran, 1500-1941, p. 283.
50 Ibid., pp. 292-293.
51 Wilbur, p. 201.
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posts in the telephone and telegraph offices. Within Iran some 690 Germans were
employed by the Iranian government or by German firms, and the community, including
wives and children, totaled between 1,200 and 2,000 persons. 52 German activity was
centered at the Deutsches Haus in Tehran, under the supervision of the German minister,
an SS officer, who directed a legation staff said to number several hundred people. 53
British and Soviet concern about the existence of a German fifth column led to
demands that the Iranian government expel four-fifths of all Germans from the country.
The Iranian government replied that German technicians could not be expelled without
adverse effects on Iran's relations with Germany, because such an action would infringe
on Iranian neutrality and invite German retaliation. 54 At dawn on 25 August 1941, British
and Russian forces began a simultaneous invasion of Iran. This was followed by a
memorandum to the Iranian government demanding expulsion of all German citizens and
the termination of diplomatic relations with Germany. On 9 September 1941, the Iranian
government accepted all demands and signed an agreement placing the greater part of the
country under the control of the British and Soviet forces. 55
The Germans departed Iran in late September 1941. By that time, the British had
taken 400 German suspects and the Russians about 60. However, the German agents
52 George Kirk, ed., The Middle East in the War, London, 1952, p. 132. Cited in Wilbur, p. 201.
53 Ibid.
54 Kirk, p. 133. Cited in Wilbur, p. 204.
55 Wilbur, pp. 206-207.
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Roman Gamotta and Franz Mayer escaped. 56 Negotiations with Britain and Russia were
delayed because, according to a British account, Iranian sympathizers with Germany still
remained in official positions. In January 1942, the internal tribal situation and actual
developments of the course of the war increased British concern about residual German
activities. At that time, Franz Mayer and Iranian sympathizers were attempting to stir up
revolts among the Kurds and other tribes in northern Iran. Another major German agent
escapee in Iran, Berthold Schultze, incited the Qashqa'i tribes in the south. 57
On 29 January 1942, Iran signed of the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain and
the Soviet Union. While this formally changed its status from a neutral to a noncombatant
ally of Britain and the Soviet Union, the fundamental attitudes that precipitated a policy of
neutrality in the beginning of the war did not change overnight. An age-old distrust of
Russia and dislike of Britain fostered Iran's previously friendly relations with Germany.
For this reason, Iran was slow in declaring war on Germany. Allied successes in North
Africa and in the Soviet defense of Stalingrad gradually shifted Iran's attitude toward the
Allies. Additionally, Allied successes undermined the activities of German agents in Iran
and led to the arrest of many Iranians suspected of pro-German activities. On 9
September 1943, Iran declared war on Germany.




C. FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND BRAN UNTIL 1990
The Federal Republic of Germany, following the lead of the United States,
established close ties with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi after 1953. In 1965, a treaty
was concluded between West Germany and Iran on the promotion of mutual protection of
capital investments. By the late 1960s, West Germany vied with the United States as the
largest source of Iranian imports.
Iran was a natural market for West German industrial firms. They could meet the
heavy engineering and construction needs for Iran's industrialization. A visit to Tehran by
Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1972 produced a long-term plan for economic cooperation
between the two countries. 58 This guaranteed a major West German role in Iran's
development. West Germany would obtain Iranian oil and gas, while West German firms,
confident of Iran's stability, believed they would obtain a good return on their
investment. 59
The quadrupling of oil prices in 1973, and the associated financial wealth for oil-
exporters, set the stage for an major increase in West German exports to Iran and other
countries in the Middle East. The sudden increase in purchasing power available to oil
exporters, combined with the desire of oil importers to balance their trade accounts and
5° Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 257.
59 Ibid.
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ensure stable supplies of oil, gave great impetus to trade. 60 In 1974, the shah purchased a
25.01 percent share of the West German steel firm Krupp. While this endowed Krupp
with needed funds, it provided a basis for German assistance in expanding steel production
in Iran. 61 Also purchased was a 25.02 percent share of the engineering firm Deutsche
Babcock. The shah's attempt to purchase 25 percent of Daimler-Benz did not succeed.
In 1974, West German firms secured lucrative contracts in Iran. This included a
joint venture agreement to build a refinery and petrochemical complex at Bushehr. In
1975, construction began on a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Plans for a tri-national
pipeline to transport natural gas from Iran to Germany via Russia was another ambitious
project. 62 This arrangement came to an abrupt halt with the Iranian revolution.
In November 1978, Shi'ite leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni said from exile in
Paris that agreements concluded between Iran and Federal Republic would continue to be
honored after a power transfer in Iran.63 Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's departure from
Iran in January 1979 was followed by Khomeyni's return in February. In August, the
Iranian government canceled all agreements concluded with the Federal Republic under
the shah, including a contract for six Type 209 submarines and a port expansion project at
"" Thomas L. Ilgen and T. J. Pempel, Trading Technology: Europe and Japan in the Middle East, New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1987, p. 23.
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Bushehr. 64 Also suspended was construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which
the new regime saw as an example of the shah's corruption. Kraftwerke Union ended its
work on the two reactors. 65 Two major projects begun by German firms in 1975-1976
were to be completed: a Thyssen oil refinery project and Deutsche Babcock's work on
two oil-heated power plants. The new Iranian government maintained the percentages of
German firms originally purchased by the shah.
The German-Iranian relationship generated controversies before the Islamic
revolution. The 1968 student revolution that upended German society began as a protest
in June 1967 during a visit by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to Berlin. While the protest
was a leftist movement organized to fight constitutional emergency legislation, the Federal
Republic's ties with the shah's undemocratic regime in Iran offered additional fuel. 66 In
1976, out of deference to the shah, Amnesty International was not allowed to hold a
planned human rights conference on Iran in West Germany. 67
When Iranian demonstrators overran the American embassy in Tehran in
November 1979, taking American hostages, Chancellor Schmidt reaffirmed the Federal
Republic's solidarity with the United States and pledged to use Bonn's influence to secure
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their release. 68 Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff said oil from Iran not bought
by the United States owing to the import ban would not be passed on to the Federal
Republic. Freezing Iranian assets, however, was out of the question. Germany would not
participate in economic sanctions without Britain, France, and Japan. 69 The idea of a
boycott brought the federal government into conflict with its own intentions not to link
politics with trade, if avoidable. It was claimed the federal government did not have the
far-reaching authority of the American President to block all Iranian accounts or ban the
import of Iranian oil. 70 An economic boycott was also seen as a violation of Germany's
1965 treaty with Iran on the promotion of mutual protection of capital investments. The
federal government was also concerned for the safety of the 1,500 Germans living in
Iran. 71
The Germans did not want to freeze Iranian accounts in German banks,
discontinue trade, and ban Iranian oil. Despite restrictions, trade with Iran was otherwise
normal. While the Germans felt an obligation to go along with the American call for the
implementation of sanctions, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher both agreed that the Federal Republic must avoid a trade boycott. It
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would hurt German interests. Economics Minister Lambsdorff claimed there were only
two small buyers of Iranian oil in the Federal Republic—Veba and the Saarland Refinery.
The government did not want to prohibit industry from exporting goods. 72 Bankers and
the government argued that Tehran maintained its financial commitments. The Iranians
indicated they would like to make Deutsche Bank—along with two other European
institutions—their bank in Europe. 73
By March 1980, Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign Minister Genscher were still
skeptical about sanctions. Bonn feared that the position of Iranian president, Abdol Hasan
Bani-Sadr, who was regarded as a moderate, might be shaken and that extremist forces
might gain the upper hand. 74 German talks with Iranian officials sought a diplomatic
solution to the hostage crisis. 75
In April 1980, the German ambassador to Tehran, Gerhard Ritzel, was recalled to
Bonn for consultations after European Community (EC) foreign ministers presented a
demarche on the freeing of American hostages to Iranian President Bani-Sadr. 76 Bonn
continued to advocate that any decisions on sanctions should be taken jointly by the nine
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EC members. Schmidt and Genscher saw no need to break relations. The German
embassy continued to maintain official contacts with Tehran. According to the intellectual
father of "change through rapprochement," Social Democratic Party Federal Manager
Egon Bahr: "Diplomatic relations are an instrument and not a punishment or reward to a
partner."77 Genscher stressed that diplomatic relations needed to be maintained in the
interests of the hostages. 78 His position was that dialogue must not be interrupted,
especially in difficult situations. 79
Following an EC foreign ministers' decision on 23 April, the Federal Cabinet
cleared the way for a package of economic sanctions against Iran effective 17 May.
German companies could no longer expect approval of new contracts with Iran. The
measures concerned goods and services, the granting of loans, the opening of new
accounts or the increasing of existing accounts, but not current payments. Food and
medicines were exempted. 80 The sanctions would not include contracts concluded prior
to the taking of hostages on 4 November 1979. Economics Minister Lambsdorff, made it
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clear that Bonn supported economic measures, not because of the effect of sanctions, but
because of the Federal Republic's relations with the United States. 81
Germany adhered to a policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, which began in
1980. In January 1981, the release of the American hostages allowed for a gradual
resumption of commercial relations. Iranian Foreign Minister Mir Hoseyn Mussavi visited
Bonn in October 1981. His successor as foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, visited
Bonn in February 1982. Trade peaked in 1983, when Iran purchased $3 billion worth of
German exports. In July 1984, Foreign Minister Genscher visited Iran. He returned to
Bonn with the impression the Iranian leadership wanted political dialogue and economic
cooperation with the West. 82 According to Genscher:
If we are to have any influence on its policy, we must ensure that Iran is
not forced into isolation. It seems to me that Iran is now more open in the
area of relations with Western states. This would also serve our interests.
There is considerable interest in establishing and developing economic
relations with the FRG, in particular. 83
In truth, the Federal Republic had dominated bilateral trade with Iran since 1 98 1 . West
German firms benefited from their willingness to stay and meet contractual obligations
even as many of their competitors departed because of the Iran-Iraq War.
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In October 1986, 100-150 demonstrators penetrated the German embassy grounds
in Tehran and attempted to storm the embassy's main building. 84 The demonstration
ended when the police arrived and the demonstrators dispersed. The demonstration was
in protest of the closing of an Iranian stand at the Frankfurt book fair after clashes
between stand officials and Iranian opposition students. The foreign ministry in Bonn
received an apology from the Iranians. 85
Genscher's mediation efforts to end the Iran-Iraq War played a role in Tehran's
acceptance of the U.N. Security Council cease-fire resolution in August 1988. The end of
the eight-year war offered the international business community with lucrative
reconstruction contracts and West German firms were well-represented as Iran's leading
supplier. Roughly 100 West German firms were represented in Iran, 20 with joint
ventures. 86 In September 1988, hoping to secure additional contracts, representatives
from 70 West German firms accompanied Dieter von Wiirzen, the Secretary of State at
the Economics Ministry, to the West German industrial exhibition Tehran. 87 In November
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1988, Genscher visited Tehran accompanied by 1 12 industrialists and officials. 88 The two
sides signed a cultural and scientific exchange treaty and scheduled an economic
cooperation meeting. Financial credit for the Iranians was also discussed. 89 In December
1988, Federal Construction Minister Oscar Schneider led representatives of the German
Construction and Building Machinery Industries to Iran. Even the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) was represented, collaborating on the construction of a steel rolling mill
as well as a number of chemical and cement plants. 90
Iran needed to repair war damage to its petrochemical facilities and industrial
infrastructure. Priorities included rehabilitation and expansion of oil, power,
telecommunications, and transportation facilities. Since oil traditionally accounted for
more than 90 percent of foreign currency earnings, most investment was initially
concentrated in that sector.
Foreign Minister Genscher wanted to move quickly to improve political and
economic cooperation to pave the way for a broader rapprochement in Iranian-Western
relations. Genscher wanted progress in the human rights situation in Iran and rapid
movement on the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. 91 In February 1989, events
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would prove otherwise when Ayatollah Khomeyni's/atfwtf against Salman Rushdie led the
EC to withdraw its ambassadors from Tehran once again.
D. FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND IRAN SINCE 1990
Foreign Minister Genscher's attempts to improve German relations with Iran were
complicated by the Salman Rushdie affair, the holding of Western hostages in Lebanon,
and human rights issues. In 1991, however, there was a temporary improvement. In
March, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati visited Bonn. In April, Bundeswehr soldiers
deployed to western Iran as part of Germany's humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi
Kurdish refugees. 92 In May, Genscher made another visit to Tehran. High-level
cooperation moved forward in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Genscher
agreed with the Tehran leadership that Germany should take over a bridging function in
Iran's rapprochement with the West. 93
In June 1991, Economics Minister Jiirgen Mollemann led a delegation to Tehran
for a joint economic commission—the first since the Islamic revolution. German firms
placed bids for contracts to build power stations, telephone lines, port facilities, steel
plants, aluminum plants, and cement plants. An agreement was reached to build Mercedes
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Benz engines in Iran. 94 Bayer saw its Iranian business double. 95 German firms were
involved in bidding to build a telecommunications satellite for Iran. 96 While, a request by
Kraftwerke Union to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant was denied by the
German government—no export licenses would be granted—Bonn offered conventional
gas power stations instead. 97 In July 1991, the federal government gave up its reserved
Hermes credit policy, allowing basically for open cover toward Iran. 98
Bonn and Tehran had hopes of an improved relationship with the release of the last
two German hostages from Lebanon in June 1992. These hopes soon proved unfounded.
Genscher's departure that year from the foreign ministry was accompanied by a noticeable
sharpening of German policy toward Iran. Although Velayati visited Foreign Minister
Klaus Kinkel in Bonn in July, there was more overt official support for Salman Rushdie. 99
The adoption of the policy of "critical dialogue" at the EC summit in Edinburgh in
December 1 992 coincided with the beginning of a steady decline in trade as Iran reduced
imports. Further, matters were complicated by evidence of official Iranian involvement in
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the assassination of four exiled Iranian Kurds at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in
September 1992.
From 1993 through 1996, thefatwa against Salman Rushdie, the Mykonos trial,
and other problems prevented a normalization of relations. German business with Iran
continued to decline. In April 1997, relations reached a new low point following the
Mykonos court verdict. Bonn suspended "critical dialogue" and recalled its ambassador,
Horst Baechmann, from Tehran The crisis forced a reassessment of German policy.
Trade has played the most prominent role in the Federal Republic of Germany's
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, unlike economic relations under the
Weimar Republic, the government of the Federal Republic has played an active role in
promoting German business. The Germans view free trade as beneficial for both Germany
and Iran. German foreign policy has operated under the philosophy that dialogue and




m. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
Today the Federal Republic shares borders and enjoys friendly relations with nine
countries. This achievement can be partially attributed to German foreign policy.
Additionally, German democracy has been strengthened by both its relations with the
United States and by economic prosperity. This has led to economic, military, political
integration with the West, and since the end of the Cold War, increasingly closer ties to
the East. German extra-European policy reflects this experience.
A. FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND EXTRA-EUROPEAN POLICY, 1949-1990
Federal German statecraft throughout the postwar period was shaped by a unique
set of factors—national partition, the burdens of German history, and the reality of being
on the front line of the Cold War. 100 Germany's division was the central element of its
foreign policy, and determined its relations beyond Europe. In the 1950s, under the
government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, reunification was pursued by attempting to
limit East German contacts outside the Soviet bloc. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine
denied any legitimacy to the German Democratic Republic. Under it, the Federal Republic
refused to engage in relations with any country, other than the Soviet Union, that
100 Ronald D. Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, Santa Monica: RAND, 1992, p. 32.
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recognized East Germany. 101 The Hallstein Doctrine was intended to pressure other
states into accepting Bonn's position that it was the heir of all the former Reich. 102
Adenauer's "policy of strength" accorded with the Eisenhower administration's
policy of containment. 103 The success of Bonn's pro-Western security and recovery
policy, through which the Federal Republic became the bulwark of Washington's
containment policy in Europe, solidified the Cold War alliances in Central Europe and
further deepened the division of Germany. 104 The raising of the Berlin Wall in 1961,
however, ended any hopes for a rapid demise of the GDR. 105 Further, after the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962, Chancellor Adenauer's "policy of strength" collided with the
Kennedy administration's shift towards a policy of detente and pursuit of nuclear arms
control with the Soviet Union. Adenauer insisted that a solution of the German problem
had to be a precondition for detente, while the Kennedy administration believed it might
only by achieved as the result of a long process of detente, if at all. Nevertheless, the
Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) foreign policy remained centered on the Hallstein
Doctrine. 106
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In 1963, Social Democratic Party (SPD) politician Egon Bahr, in speech in
Tutzing, called for a new approach to the East through a policy of "small steps" that
would lead to "change through rapprochement." 107 It was in this spirit that Chancellor
Willy Brandt initiated the policy of Ostpolitik aimed at closer relations with all the states
of Eastern Europe when a coalition formed by the SPD and the Free Democratic Party
(FDP) took office in 1969. Brandt had already introduced a few reforms to lay the
foundation for the new Ostpolitik while he was foreign minister in the "Grand Coalition"
government with Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger from 1966 to 1969. 108 From 1970 to 1972,
Brandt sought, and obtained, treaty agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland, and East
Germany recognizing the Federal Republic's postwar boundaries and establishing relations
with the Eastern bloc states. 109 This policy of opening to the east became a continuous
thread in the policies practiced by both center-left and center-right governments in Bonn
over the two decades preceding the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Ostpolitik rested on the
assumptions that, first, the Federal Republic, despite the crimes subsequently committed
by communist regimes, had a special responsibility to compensate Eastern Europe for the
aggression and atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany; and, second, that a web of treaties
and agreements with the Soviet bloc would improve human rights for the citizens of these
neighboring communist states, while creating a peace-inducing dialogue with communist
107 Craig and George, p. 120.
108 Gutjahr, p. 26.
109 Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p.
15.
39
regimes. Ostpolitik involved West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union, its ties to
East Germany, and its dealings with the rest of Eastern Europe. In the case of East
Germany, Ostpolitik represented Bonn's attempt through dialogue and cooperation to
overcome the burdens of Germany's division.
Gradually, the link between reunification and detente became reversed. The main
goal of the West German Ostpolitik became a general change in the relationship between
East and West, a process at the end of which the systemic differences between East and
West would disappear and, along with them, the border between East and West Germany.
The policy was designed to maintain an all-German national consciousness.
West Germany's adherence to a policy of detente was controversial at its outset.
In opposition, the CDU argued against the policies pursued by Chancellors Brandt and
Schmidt. However, when the CDU returned to power in coalition with the FDP in 1982,
the new CDU-FDP government avoided a return to the Hallstein Doctrine. The basic
interest of the West German public in detente was too strong to be neglected. The mix of
a strong interest in detente with an unabated distrust of the Soviets and their ulterior
motives was very much evident in the picture of West German attitudes that emerges from
a number of public opinion polls. Even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
an overwhelming majority of West Germans favored continuing a policy of detente. 110
1 10
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However, the support of West Germans for Ostpolitik was not necessarily matched by the
perceived results. Most Germans believed that the Soviet Union benefited most from the
policy of detente. ] ] ' Still most West Germans believed that the policy was the best way to
bring about changes in Eastern Europe. They believed that the cause of human rights
could be furthered through quiet diplomacy and continuing cooperation. West Germany
refused to impose economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and other Eastern
European countries to force an improvement of general or specific human rights. This
strained German-American relations and left the Federal Republic open to charges that it
was interested in detente merely to reap economic benefits from East-West trade and that
it disregarded the potential danger of strengthening the Soviet Union. 112 One of the
benefits West Germany expected from trade with Eastern Europe, however, was political
and social change, at least over the long run. For that reason, as well as for more
commercial ones, West Germany continued to trade with the Soviet Union and other
Eastern European countries. 113 This made West Germany the East's major Western
trading partner.
According the Peter J. Katzenstein, the foreign policies of Chancellor Adenauer
—
integration with the West—and Chancellor Brandt—accommodation with the East—were
111 Ibid, p. 51.
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a means of securing their position in power. 114 In both cases, foreign policy promised
substantial long-term political gains for a particular social alliance and coalition
government. Adenauer and Brandt succeeded because their foreign policy strategies
exploited opportunities in the international state system which West Germany's domestic
structures simply did not do. Domestic politics also illustrated how the opposition reacted
to the foreign policy successes of Adenauer and Brandt. Because it realistically wanted to
improve its electoral chances, the SPD embraced the policy of Western integration after
1959. When Brandt became foreign minister in 1966 and chancellor in 1969, continuity in
the policy of Western integration was beyond doubt. Similarly, after its electoral defeat of
1972, the CDU gradually came to accept the premise of Ostpolitik. When the CDU
returned to power in 1982, Chancellor Kohl continued the Eastern policy of the previous
coalition government. Continuity was underscored by the fact that the liberal Free
Democrats stayed on as the junior partner in the new coalition cabinet and continued, with
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to head the foreign ministry. By then the "Genscherist"
approach had gained wide acceptance in West Germany as a pragmatic policy to reduce
international tensions and improve living conditions in East Germany. 115
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This continuity in foreign policy across different governments demonstrates the
incrementalism rather than large-scale policy change that typifies West German politics. 116
Incrementalism is a reflection of another value of German foreign policy
—
predictability
and calculability (Berechenbarkeit) xxl Stability is valued above all. This strong interest
in continuity and the inclination for not upsetting any kind of balance comes from the
knowledge of the ill-effects of incalculability from 1890 to 1945. German foreign policy is
to always be predictable and, to others, calculable. 118
The economic system (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) adopted by the Federal Republic
in 1949, under the watchful eye of the Allied occupiers, was based on liberal economic
principles. 119 This endorsement of the free market forces at home was complemented by a
commitment to free trade abroad and a belief that German economic recovery and
subsequent growth would be fostered by exports. While the federal government has
intervened to ensure a favorable economic climate to German exporters, economic
initiative has remained primarily in the hands of the private sector. 120
The sectors dominating West Germany's postwar economic miracle
{Wirtschaftswunder) were mechanical engineering, the electrical industry, and chemicals
—
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the same sectors that had been the backbone of German economic might prior to the war.
The competitiveness of these sectors was assisted by the close links between corporate
leaders and German banks.
The German banking sector still dominates the economy and owns large portions
of stock in major corporations. Moreover, bankers regularly serve on the supervisory
boards of these corporations, participating actively in strategic planning and investment
decisions. 121 Cooperation between the corporate and financial sectors of the economy is
particularly advantageous in the negotiation and financing of exports.
West Germany's commitment to economic liberalism included a distinction
between private and public activities. This complemented the country's larger postwar
foreign policy strategy, which was to separate diplomatic affairs from commercial
relations. Market criteria, not domestic or international politics, were seen as desirable
guides to choices both in the local economy and in foreign trade. However, keeping
politics out of economic affairs is more difficult as a state's international economic
influence grows, which was the case from the 1960s on. The West German strategy—to
downplay politics and diplomacy and to give attention to commercial relations by
supporting the initiatives of the private sector—brought high returns in trade and
investment. 122 Insisting that trade and politics should remain separate, West German
businesses frequently flourished when political entanglements jeopardized the business of
121
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non-German firms. 123 This strategy paid off in post- 1979 Iran. West German firms were
willing to stay in the market and meet contractual obligations even as many of their
competitors departed.
The Federal Republic of Germany was constructed after the Second World War
with a moral debt and political commitment to the state of Israel that has limited and
complicated its relations with other states in the Middle East. Germany and Israel
established diplomatic relations in 1965. However, already in the early 1950s,
negotiations between Chancellor Adenauer and Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel
resulted in the 1953 Restitution Agreement. 124 The Federal Republic's policy concerning
the Near and Middle East has been based on the principles of the right to exist of all states
of that region, including Israel, within recognized and secure borders; the right to self-
determination by the Palestinian people; and the nonuse of force by all parties. The
peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and later the Iran-Iraq War were central
objectives of West German policy. 125
B. GERMAN FOREIGN AND COMMERCIAL POLICY MECHANISMS
During the Allied occupation from 1945 to 1949, checks and balances were
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government. 126 The chancellor, cabinet, and legislature all contribute to the policy-
making process. The federal chancellor is responsible for general policy, and the Federal
Chancellery (the chancellor's office) serves as the center for policy review and
coordination. The chancellor's direct executive role is limited. Although the chancellor
has wide powers to name political appointees in government, he does not enjoy complete
freedom in making appointments to cabinet posts. A number of cabinet positions are filled
by coalition partners. Since the late 1960s, such important posts as economics and foreign
affairs have been controlled by the FDP, Helmut Kohl's junior coalition partner, which
adheres to free market principles.
1. Foreign Policy Mechanisms
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the central department for planning and
implementing foreign policy. It shares responsibility for foreign economic policy with the
Ministry for Economics and the Ministry of Finance. Security policy is coordinated with
the Ministry of Defense. Although the executive branch takes the initiative in foreign
affairs, the Bundestag (the lower house of parliament) and the Bundesrat (the upper house
of parliament, where the Lander are represented) are involved in the policy-making
process. These bodies ratify foreign treaties and approve most foreign affairs legislation
and budgetary provisions. Parliamentary groups in the Bundestag and various committees
125
"Government Document Sets Out Middle East Policy," Hamburg DPA, 0002 GMT, 17 November
1987, FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-87-222, 18 November 1987, p. 8.
46
provide organizational structure for the policy making process. Moreover, power is
divided between the federal and Land governments. Foreign policy is the prerogative of
the federal government, but Lander (federal states, e.g., Bavaria or Lower Saxony) are
permitted to conclude agreements with foreign countries. These agreements, however,
are subject to approval by the federal government.
2. Commercial Policy Mechanisms
The policies of three government ministries affect the strategy of exports—the
Federal Ministry of Economics, the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and
Technology, and the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. The
Federal Ministry of Economics {Bundesministerium fiir Wirtschaft, or BMWi) acts as the
primary ministry on issues of economic policy. In addition to collecting and disseminating
information useful to German exporters, the ministry engages in promotional activities to
boost trade and investment opportunities. Among the most common is the organization of
high-level commercial missions to the Middle East that bring together government
officials, trade association leaders, and representatives of individual firms. 127
The Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Technology
{Bundesministerium fiir Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, or BMBF),
12° xhe protocol for terminating the occupation regime was signed on 23 October 1954 and took effect on
5 May 1955. The Federal Republic did not technically become a sovereign state until that date, although
its constitution, the Basic Law, took effect in 1949.
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is the second government ministry involved in technology exports. 128 BMBF is concerned
about the application of research to industrial development and industrial policy in
Germany. The ministry's participation in technology trade is based on a belief that
successful international technology transfer must begin with extensive research contacts
between suppliers and recipients. These contacts will bring commercial opportunities for
technologies developed in Germany. The typical pattern is for Germany to conclude a
scientific and technical cooperation agreement with a developing country. Such an
agreement may be defined broadly or target specific industries. Following this type of
agreement, there is generally an exchange of technical personnel, and projects are assigned
to the appropriate German and Middle Eastern research institutes. 129
The third federal ministry with activities related exports is the Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development {Bundesministerhtm fur Wirtschaftliche
Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, or BMZ). This ministry coordinates all German
foreign aid programs aimed at raising the economic, social, and environmental conditions
of countries in the third world. The policy is to enhance administrative efficiency, improve
the functioning of market economies, and encourage better use of applied technologies. 130
Three semi-autonomous agencies operate under BMZ. The Kreditanstalt fur
Wiederaufbau (KfW) arranges financing. The Company for Technical Cooperation
128 Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Technology. Online. Available
http://www.bmdf.de/menues/english.htm




{Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, or GTZ) coordinates
technical aid and training in developing countries. The German Development Company
{Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH, or DEG) organizes capital
investment projects. The DEG is administered by a supervisory board made up of
government officials and representatives from industry, banking, and trade unions. The
DEG solicits and approves project proposals from private German firms. 131
Following dictates with antecedents in the nineteenth century, the German
government gives considerable attention to policies designed to promote foreign trade and
investment. The government strategy is driven by recognition of mutual interests between
the Federal Republic and developing countries pursuing growth-oriented strategies.
Private sector organizations are also active in promoting German technology trade and
investment. The associations of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT)
provide advisory services to members as well as many of the services normally assigned to
the commercial sections of embassies abroad. It has negotiated bilateral chambers of
commerce agreements with most countries in the Middle East. Under public law, DIHT
must also provide advice to the government on various aspects of commercial policy.
Generally, its position reaffirms the liberal position of the Ministry of Economics at home
and abroad. German chambers of commerce also supervise vocational training in the
Federal Republic. Local chapters control three-year programs that not only train German
workers, but are open to foreign employees who might receive training as part of a
131 Ibid, pp. 112, 117.
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management contract with a large German firm. There are opportunities for pre-contract
training, on-the-job training, and retraining. 132
The many German trade associations organized by industry and coordinated
through the Federation of German Industries (BDI) also promote exports. Most German
trade associations are well organized and well financed and provide a wide range of
services to would-be exporters. One of the most important for the Middle East is the
German Mechanical Engineering Trade Association {Verein Deutscher Maschinenbau-
Anstalten, or VDMA), which represents most of all German heavy and light industry. In
chemicals, the Verband der Chemische Industrie (VCI) enjoys a similar reputation for
influence. In consulting, the Union of Independent Consulting Engineers (VUBI) has been
successful at promoting business for its members who do business in the Middle East. 133
A trade association directed specifically to the Middle East is the Near and Middle
East Association (Nah und Mittlost Verein, or NMV), founded first as the German-
Persian Society in 1918 and renamed the German-Orient Society in 1934. Like other
trade associations, the NMV gathers information and attempts to find business
opportunities for its members. The NMV also promoted the establishment of the Oriental
Institute in Hamburg, a small group of scholars outside the university system who do
medium- and long-term studies on political, social, and legal developments in the Middle
East, assessing their implications for German commerce. The institute is funded primarily
132 Ibid, p. 113.
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by the state of Hamburg (an SPD federal state) and receives additional support from
German private foundations. 134
The Germans offer a variety of supportive measures for those engaged in exports.
Exporters secure insurance and financing through a mix of private and government-
authorized agencies and institutions. Insurance is supplied through a government-
sanctioned consortium led by the private export insurance company, Hermes. The Federal
Republic depends primarily on the banking system to extend credit at market rates for the
financing of exports. Long-term financing to the Middle East is also available via
consortium lending. The normal channel is the Ansfuhrkredit Gesellschaft (AKA), a
private syndication of commercial banks that acts as a mechanism for pooling the credit
resources of its members. A second source of financing is the KfW. 135
The government and the private sector have viewed technical training as a valuable
resource to be exported and a means to develop markets abroad for German technology
exports. The private sector has attempted to capitalize on the strengths of German
technical education by linking training provisions in management contracts to technical
programs administered by local chapters of the DIHT. The government in Bonn has also
given attention to training. The bilateral scientific and technical agreements implemented
by the Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Technology frequently begin
cooperative research projects with educational opportunities for foreign scientists,
134
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engineers, and technicians. However, the most extensive commitment to training is made
through the GTZ, the BMZ's agency of technical cooperation. The GTZ sends its own
experts and consultants to work on local development projects, particularly to assist with
the training of local personnel. The GTZ works closely with the KfW and the DEG in
deciding which projects are most worthy of support. The German foreign aid program,
through the coordinated activities of the KfW, DEG, and GTZ, is designed to support the
efforts of private German firms to sell their goods and services in developing countries.
The foreign aid effort also seeks to ensure that such goods and services are absorbed
effectively by those countries' economies. 136
C. TRANSITION SINCE 1990
Following the unification of Germany on 3 October 1990, the Federal Republic did
not have much time before a succession of major events—the Gulf War, the unraveling of
the Soviet Union, war in the Balkans, and attempted coups in Russia—forced Bonn to
rethink its foreign policy. German foreign policy adapted slowly. Whereas the new
Germany was under growing pressure from its allies to take on new responsibilities in the
world, it also felt obliged (because of those same allies) to show restraint in its foreign
policy actions as a unified state. 137 The country was preoccupied with the challenge of
East German reconstruction.
136 Ibid, pp. 118-119.
137 Gordon, pp. 36-37.
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Although the Federal Republic is a major economic power, it never developed
strategic thinking as is found in the United States, Britain, or France. Concepts such as
grand strategy remained largely off limits. Open debates about Germany's national
interests rarely occurred. "Geopolitics" was a term that Germans avoided for it reminded
them of Machtpolitik and a militaristic past that contemporary Germany has forsworn. 138
The West German political elite proudly pointed out that Germans were seeking to define
a postnational identity in the context of European integration and the Atlantic alliance.
German diplomats became experts in shrouding their interests in the diplomatic language
of multilateralism and integration. 139
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian
Social Union (CSU), stress that transatlantic links should be given more priority over
more European-dominated organizations such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The CDU is a middle of the road grouping with a
generally conservative policy and broad political appeal. 140 The CSU has distinguished
itself from the CDU by pushing a slightly more confident tone regarding what its members
perceive as German national interests. The FDP is probably the least nationalistic and the
most multilateralist in philosophy of the German political parties when it comes to the
138 Ronald D. Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall 1990-J 993, Santa Monica: RAND,
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subject of foreign policy. It stands for free enterprise without government intervention. 141
The SPD is fundamentally multilateralist on foreign policy issues. 142 It was the primary
advocate of detente during the Cold War. The SPD is a strong proponent of human
rights, intercultural dialogue, and export controls for dual-use goods. 143 The Greens, a
western German environmentalist party, united in 1993 with an eastern German political
group, Alliance 90, to form Alliance 90/The Greens, commonly called the Greens.
1. Extra-European Policy
One of the most important questions facing a unified Germany is how and where it
will define its "vital interests." While the issue of German unification was a central
element of the Federal Republic's foreign policy during the Cold War, a unified Germany
must now determine its geopolitical role in Europe and beyond.
Germany's global interests include respect for human rights, the fight against
poverty, the preservation of natural resources, and the non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. 144 Although Germany again became Europe's largest and potentially
most powerful country, it has also inherited the enduring dilemmas rooted in geography
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and geopolitics. With the end of the Cold War, German leaders see the new strategic
challenges in and around Europe almost exclusively along the so-called "arcs of crisis." 145
One is an eastern arc—the zone of instability between Germany and Russia running from
Northern Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus, and Middle Asia. Another is a
southern arc, running through Northern Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle
East, and Southwest Asia. These "arcs of crisis" encompass the numerous potential points
of conflict from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and from Germany's eastern border to
Central Asia. While Germany remains preoccupied with the challenge of the political and
economic reconstruction of its eastern half, the need to stabilize Germany's eastern flank
is a primary security concern for the German political class. The countries of the
Caucasus and Central Asia are considered significant as the political-cultural point of
contact between Europe and Asia. They are the point where various strategic interests
intersect means that the instability prevailing in the region is of particular significance to
the peaceful development of Europe. Middle East and Southwestern Asia are also
considered a potential threat to Europe. Cross border environmental problems,
immigration problems, dependence on raw materials and the free movement of trade, the
increasing indebtedness of the economies of this region as well as the interdependence of
the financial markets are factors the Federal Republic considers threats to the social and
145 Asmus, German Strategy and Opinion After the Wall 1990-1993, pp. 7-8.
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economic stability of Europe. The region is also considered of key importance for the
future relationship between Europe and the Islamic world. 146
2. Foreign and Commercial Policy Mechanisms
The Preamble to the Basic Law states that the foreign and security policy objective
of Germany is to "serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe." 147
Continuing the process of European integration remains a central foreign policy objective
of the Federal Republic. This affects German relations beyond Europe as German foreign
and commercial policy is increasingly coordinated with other members of the European
Union.
a) Foreign Policy Mechanisms
The Federal Republic, following unification, adopted a policy aimed at
integrating itself into the primary instruments of international cooperation: the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU, the Council of Europe, the Western
European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), and the United Nations. Bonn's foreign policy emphasized multilateralism in a
deliberate effort to minimize concerns about German dominance on the continent.
President Richard von Weizsacker, Chancellor Kohl, and Foreign Minister Genscher went
to great lengths to stress Germany's intention to renounce the power politics of past eras




in favor of a "policy of responsibility." In the German view, this meant a continuation of
West German foreign policy based on the use of nonmilitary instruments. It also called for
a higher international profile in economic, human rights, and environmental issues. With
the end of the Cold War, economic power, the Germans believed, had superseded military
power in terms of political influence.
European integration and transatlantic cooperation in the Atlantic alliance
rank among the objectives of German foreign policy. The preservation of a vital Atlantic
alliance and a substantial presence of the United States in Europe continue to be the basic
conditions of German security and Europe's stability. 148 NATO remains the central
instrument for German and European defense, given that the EU, the WEU, and the
OSCE are all still relatively untested in the coordination and implementation of defense
policies.
Germany has sought closer coordination with the EU's common foreign
and security policy (CFSP). However, CFSP often remains an aspiration rather than a
reality. National differences persist, as has been apparent in the former Yugoslavia. In
December 1991, the Federal Republic's recognition of Croatia and Slovenia forced the
EC's hand and reawakened historical fears over German power in some quarters.
Nevertheless, the EU can serve the important function of shifting political responsibilities
from individual capitals to the Union's bureaucracy in Brussels. A European context can
provide the political cover for Germany to spread its wings in geopolitical issues without
148
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having to take steps on a national basis that could reawaken historical fears over German
power. 149 Additionally, the Federal Republic can escape direct blame for controversial
trade policies by pursuing them together with its European partners, and, if need be, by
hiding behind the decision-making process in Brussels.
b) Commercial Policy Mechanisms
Agencies subordinate to the Ministry of Economics (BMWi) include the
Federal Office of Economics, Federal Export Office, and the German Foreign Trade
Information Office. The Federal Office of Economics {Bimdesamt fitr Wirtschaft, or
BAW) translates national laws, directives, ordinances, and regulations of the EU into
concrete decisions on individual cases for companies and private individuals. 150
Export control tasks formerly undertaken by the Federal Office of
Economics (BAW), were taken over by the newly established Federal Export Office
(Bundesausfuhramt, BAFA) in April 1992. BAFA reviews whether or not the export of a
given article requires a license. The specific approval requirements and prohibitions are
outlined in the War Weapons Control Act and in the Foreign Trade and Payments
Ordinance. In addition, the export of war weapons is subject to licensing pursuant to War
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Weapons Control Act. As a rule, European statutes apply for the export of dual-use
goods and armaments, including the transfer of technology. 151
The German Foreign Trade Information Office (Bundesstelle fur
Aussenhandelsinformation, BfAI) assists German and foreign economic partners. It
provides up-to-date information on important markets abroad and on the eastern German
market. In particular, BfAI assists small- and medium-sized companies with exports,
imports, cooperation projects, and investments. The office also provides information on
Germany as business location to potential foreign investors. BfAI focuses on the market
situation, production locations, foreign trade, legal foundations for economic cooperation,
marketing networks, assistance measures, and contact offices in Germany and abroad. 152
D. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN IRAN POLICY
German policy is based on the assumption that Iranian behavior can be influenced
through communication and incentives. Unlike the United States, which carries the
burden of traumatic events involving Iran and' classifies the country as a "rogue nation,"
the Federal Republic considers Iran to be a regional power with an important role in
maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. The debate in Germany is
not whether to engage Iran, but over the priorities of that engagement.
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1. Shape of the Debate
Conflicting issues affect Germany's Iran policy. Economic interests compete with
human rights priorities and proliferation concerns. Tolerance of Iranian intelligence
activities threatens the Iranian dissident community in Germany. Iranian dissidents
compete with the Iranian government to influence German public opinion and government
policy. As a result, there are apparent contradictions in the relations between the Federal
Republic and Iran.
a) Economics
Germany depends on foreign trade. Per capita, the country exports twice
as much as Japan and more than three times as much as the United States. The export-
driven economy is based on manufacturing industries, which employ over 40 percent of
the work force (specifically chemicals, automobiles, and electrical and mechanical
engineering). 153 Exports generally account for around one-third of gross domestic
product (GDP). According to the Federal Economics Ministry, about 15,000 German
jobs depend on business with Iran. 154
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There are 169 German firms represented in Iran. Iran ranks forty-second
as a market for German exports and forty-ninth concerning imports. 155 In 1996, German
exports to Iran totaled a little over 2.2 billion Deutsche Marks (DM), while imports
amounted to DM 1.1 billion. 156 German exports to Iran include capital goods, equipment,
automobiles, and the provision of training. German imports from Iran include crude oil,
carpets, and tropical nuts. However, Iran is not a major source of oil for Germany. 157
Iran is interested in reducing the imbalance in bilateral trade, intensifying cooperation in
the field of training, stepping up technology transfers, and promoting investment in Iran,
particularly by medium-sized industry. 158 There has been some cooperation in
environmental questions.
In recent years, German exporters have had fewer reasons for optimism.
While Iran ranked third among non-European importers of German goods and services in
1992, after the United States and Japan, the Iranian market has declined significantly since
then. The Iranians had difficulties paying short-term loans. 159 Low foreign currency
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reserves forced them to cut back on imports. 160 Germany's proportion of total Iranian
imports has not changed much, but because Germany was the leader, the decline has been
significant. 161
The Economics Ministry, Finance Ministry, and Hermes negotiated with
the Iranian Central Bank Markazi about refinancing. 162 Debts involved around 1,000
individual demands by up to 700 exporters. 163 An agreement was reached in February
1994 on a schedule for deferred repayment. In November 1994, the BDI signed a
rescheduling agreement for uninsured German claims on Iran. About 750 companies were
party to the agreement. 164
Access to Central Asia is another element in German economic interests in
Iran. During a visit to Bonn by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in June 1994,
one of the issues discussed with German officials was the use of Iranian facilities for
reaching landlocked Central Asian markets. 165 Iran has improved its transportation links
with Central Asia. A new Iran-Turkmenistan rail link opened last year, and planned new
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links will further improve rail communication. Annual transit trade through Bandar Abbas
has tripled since 1994. 166
The importance of Central Asia was highlighted in late August 1997 when
Economics Minister Giinter Rexrodt led a 45-member delegation to the Central Asian
countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. 167 Although the
exploitation of the region's huge oil and gas reserves is mainly in the hands of non-German
companies, German firms want to participate in infrastructure development projects.
h) Human Rights
The promotion of human rights is a central policy objective of the Federal
Republic. Multilateral cooperation in human rights is conducted through the United
Nations, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
has summarized the German position:
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Massive human rights violations are a threat to international stability, they
are damaging to development, and they are a barrier to peace. As such, an
active, global policy on human rights is very much in our interest. It must
be in our aim to establish and safeguard the full spectrum of human rights,
both civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights
throughout the world...We need to pursue a preventative human rights
policy in order to ensure that human rights violations do not occur in the
first place. The means for doing this are dialogue and cooperation, but also
monitoring, public criticism and coercive measures.... 168
German policy is based on the belief that progress in human rights can be achieved
through political dialogue and economic cooperation—the two key elements of "critical
dialogue."
Over the years, German foreign policy has consistently emphasized political
dialogue to promote human rights. In 1979, Germany's view on dialogue is summarized
by government spokesman Armin Griinwald:
... if we were to maintain bilateral diplomatic relations only with countries
whose form of government is to our liking, then we might save the expense
of quite a few ambassadors. By the same token, we would lose the
possibility of exerting any influence or obtaining any political information.
Thus, it is absolutely erroneous to assume that severance of relations, for
instance, would be helpful—especially to those whose human rights we
advocate. On the contrary, it is necessary to stay in position in order to
maintain a dialogue with a government and cause things to transpire if it
can be done at all. 169
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The idea is that keeping open the lines of communication forces the Iranian political elite
to face the human rights issues unacceptable to the West.
For Germany, the other means to promote human rights is cooperation
This has primarily involved economics cooperation. From the German point of view,
trade is justified as an incentive for Iran to change its policies. According to former
Economics Minister Mollemann:
It is our conviction that in a world that mainly consists of states that do not
yet follow our concept of human rights, we should probably use the
instruments of contracts and economic cooperation better to gradually
come closer to the implementation of our guiding values. 170
Further, trade concessions in exchange for progress in human rights are seen as mutually
beneficial. Not only should Iran change its policies for the better, but Germany benefits
from exports. The problem, however, is that Iran's policies have not changed, leading to
accusations that Germany is only concerned with commercial benefits.
Public criticism and coercive measures are also mentioned by Kinkel as
means to promote a human rights policy. While it is unclear what Kinkel means by
coercive measures, Germany is more willing to use public criticism now than in the past.
In 1979, during the imposition of death sentences and swift executions of members of the
shah's regime, the German government resisted making an official protest. It did not want
a disturbance in relations with the new Iranian regime. However, in recent years, Foreign
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Minister Kinkel and other German officials have repeatedly appealed to Iran to cease the
persecution of the Baha'i community and writers like Salman Rushdie and Faraj Sarkuhi.
Nevertheless, there have been no improvements in human rights conditions in Iran as a
result of German policy.
c) Nonproliferation
The Federal Republic has demonstrated increased concern about the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile system technology.
Germany has been a primary target for the technology-acquisition efforts of countries,
such as Iran, seeking to develop these systems. According to Chancellor Kohl's
intelligence service coordinator, Bernd Schmidbauer:
We must expect that Iran will have missiles for nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons with a range of about 2,000 km in the foreseeable
future. The technology of these new carrier systems is currently being
developed and tested. It can be ready for use within five years. 171
This has raised fears, not only for regional security in the Middle East and for Israel, but
also because these systems would threaten Europe. The German government has
tightened export controls as a result.
German export controls are generally effective in thwarting many of
acquisitions attempts. However, some dual-use goods have been exported, purportedly to
* 7 1 "Schmidbauer Views Dangers of Illegal Technology Transfers," Der Spiegel, 7 July 1997, pp. 32-33,
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civilian end users. 172 Iran is responding to Western nonproliferation efforts by relying on
commercial firms as procurement fronts and by developing more convoluted procurement
networks. Iran also has tried to reduce its dependence on imports by developing an
indigenous production capability. 173 In the late 1980s, German firms assisted in the
construction of a pesticides production plant in Iran that was later suspected to be for
chemical weapons. 174
Export controls were tightened in 1992 in response to increased reports of
German nuclear exports. 175 According to the amendment to the Foreign Trade and
Payments Regulation, exporters were required to obtain permits for goods and services in
the field of nuclear technology previously exempt from export controls. In business
transactions with a group of countries that included Iran, additional goods and services
not mentioned in the export list for nuclear technology and documents related to nuclear
technology were subject to approval. 176 Still, in 1992, the approval rate for licenses to
Iran of dual-use equipment was up to 80 percent, according to officials at the Federal
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Export Office. The high approval rating applied to a list of controlled technologies
virtually identical to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(COCOM) lists used throughout the Cold War. Approval ratings were much lower for
other dual-use equipment placed on more restrictive lists because of a direct application to
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles. Approvals were virtually
nil for munitions list items, despite German sales to Iran of weapons material up until
1987 177
Bonn continued its national restrictions on the export of dual-use goods
and services after a EU harmonization went into effect in 1995. The EU restrictions apply
to all non-EU countries unless member countries enact a country list such as Germany's.
Germany requires permission for dual-use exports to other EU countries if the German-
based firm knows the goods are destined for an end customer in a listed country. 178
The Federal Intelligence Service {Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND) has
confirmed that Iran secretly and systematically imports arms. Reportedly, as many as 600
firms under Iranian influence were used for the procurement of sensitive products in
1994 179 The Economics Ministry has warned industrial companies that Iran is trying to
use German technology to boost arms programs. Iranian organizations making purchases
in Germany include the Defense Industries Organization (DIO), which imports dual-use
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technology, and the State Purchasing Organization (SPO), which is in charge of buying
equipment, weapons systems, and installations for the armed forces. 180 A procurement
network operating in Diisseldorf and other German cities has attempted to acquire
controlled equipment by exporting it to Iran by means of detour orders via other European
countries. 181 The centers of these procurement activities are in Hamburg, Schleswig-
Holstein, the Rhine-Main area, and Cologne-Diisseldorf. 182
In May 1997, the federal government introduced severe measures in an
attempt to stop arms exports to Iran. A "coordination agency for Iran" was established at
the Cologne customs investigations office to monitor suspicious "Iranian-controlled firms
in Germany." 183 Schmidbauer says generally the illegal drain of technology from Germany
has gone down considerably due to a more effective control system. 184 The BND,
however, expects Iranian procurement efforts to continue. 185
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d) Public Opinion
A series of RAND-Friedrich Naumann Foundation surveys beginning in
1 990 indicate that the Germans recognize a new and broad spectrum of possible threats
and security challenges have emerged. Postwar Germany has often shied away from
playing a leadership role in public to avoid raising fears about its power, however, the
German public sees itself as the best equipped country to play a leadership role in the EU
in terms of monetary, economic, and foreign policy. 186 There remains clear German
support for an ongoing and more balanced partnership between the United States and the
EU. Nine in ten Germans favored an expanded "partnership among equals" between the
United States and EU. Eight in ten Germans favored an expanded alliance between the
United States and Europe. RAND surveys showed the German public supports the
integration in principle and it sees a strengthened EU as a partner and as a complement to
the transatlantic relationship, not as an alternative. At the same time, there is a clear
public desire to see Bonn push German interests. 187
RAND surveys also found that a majority of the German public supports a
unified Germany's assuming more international responsibility. In 1994, that majority was
more than six in ten (62 percent). 188 Nonmilitary missions are preferred—humanitarian
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missions receiving support from 90 percent. Economic sanctions have been supported
only just above 50 percent. 189 Interestingly, as a German foreign policy goal, securing
foreign markets generally received more public support (49 to 61 percent) than preserving
human rights (39 to 51 percent) during surveys from 1991 to 1994. 19°
e) Iranian Political Influence
The Iranian government's share of ownership in German industry presents
the potential for influence on German political and economic policy. It could limit the
Federal Republic's options for dealing with the regime in Tehran. Further, it provides the
Iranian government an opportunity to influence the investment decisions of German firms
and increases the potential for technology transfers.
On 4 November 1997, Krupp and Thyssen agreed to a full merger that will
create Germany's biggest engineering firm, with almost 200,000 employees and annual
sales of $42 billion. 191 The Iranian government bought 25.01 percent of Krupp under the
shah in 1974. This share of the company was maintained even after the Islamic revolution,
and also after the company merged with Hoesch in 1991. The stake in Krupp entitles the
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Iran sought firms in eastern Germany controlled by the Treuhandstalt
privatization agency after unification. Iran planned to acquire a stake in Takraf, a crane
and dredger manufacturer, the largest machinery concern in eastern Germany. 192 Iranians
had already discussed various port projects with Takraf, particularly on Qeshm Island, in
the Strait of Hormuz. Iranians made an offer for 40 percent of the tire producer Pneumant
and the Leuna chemical factory. 193 In November 1996, Iran showed an interest in buying
the troubled firm Sket, the largest machinery concern in eastern Germany.
Political intentions, not commercial objectives, have driven the Iranian
government's recent interest in eastern German firms. Iranian investment in Germany was
DM 1.38 billion in early 1995, up from DM 645 million in 1992. 194 In truth, however,
Iran lacks the capital to export. Iran conducted its negotiations for Pneumant, for
example, at the same time low currency reserves forced it to cut back on imports from the
EU and Germany. Additionally, inefficient firms in the former East Germany offer little
promise. The Iranian government's real objective was to improve its image, especially
after revelations of its involvement in the Mykonos killings. Even if it does not make an
actual purchase, Iran still benefits from the publicity of its negotiations for troubled eastern
German companies.
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f) Iranian Intelligence Activity
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) has
reported that the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS) has its
headquarters for Western Europe at the Iranian embassy in Bonn. 195 With the help of
Iranian cover firms in Germany, the headquarters is reportedly involved in the illegal
transfer of scientific and technological information and goods that can be used for military
purposes. It is suspected to have had a role in the deaths of numerous exiled Iranians in
Europe since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution. 196
Iranian intelligence service monitors the approximately 100,000 Iranians
who live in Germany. 197 Informers are recruited among Iranians living in Germany, who
must turn up in the consulates at regular intervals to have their passports extended or
renewed. 198 Tehran has primarily focused on the largest and most active resistance group,
"People's Mojahedin of Iran," which now operates under the name of "National
Resistance of Iran." Supporters of the Kurdish minority in Iran also have become a focus,
especially those of the "Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran." In addition, purposeful
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agitation and propaganda to spread the ideas of the Islamic revolution among non-Iranian
Muslims have been a part of the work of Tehran's agents. 199
g) Dissident Community
The 100,000 Iranians in the Federal Republic are the largest Iranian
community in Europe. Many are dissidents who originally came to Germany to study or
to escape the regime in Tehran. Iranian students traditionally are the biggest group of
foreign students from the Middle East studying in German universities. In the 1980s, Iran
was one of the largest sources of applicants seeking asylum in Germany as a result of the
Islamic revolution and the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.
The dissident community has often affected German relations with Iran.
Following the revolution in 1979, the Federal Republic frequently became a battleground
between supporters and opponents of the regime. There were frequent demonstrations
against Ayatollah Khomeyni. Khomeyni supporters attacked and interrogated alleged
members of the shah's intelligence organization, SAVAK.200 The Iranian embassy and the
consulates were occupied in protest of the Khomeyni regime and mass executions in
Iran. 201 Iran Air offices and Bank Melli offices were firebombed. 202 In July 1982, Iran
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closed all of its diplomatic and consular offices in Germany after Khomeyni supporters
were expelled for attacks against Khomeyni opponents. 203 Relations were resumed after
one week following a letter from Foreign Minister Genscher to Foreign Minister
Velayati. 204
Representatives of the exiled dissident community in Germany campaigned
for international isolation of the Khomeyni regime following the fatwa against Salman
Rushdie. 205 Iranian dissidents appealed to Germany and the EU to break ties with Iran
after the Mykonos court verdict in April 1997.
//) Islamic Extremism
Iranian Islamists who promote agitation and propaganda in Germany
constitute another concern. According to the BfV, a prominent role is played by the
Islamic Center in Hamburg, which after the revolution became Iran's ideological center in
Western Europe for the spread of Iranian-style Islamism. Iran has tried to infiltrate
mosques throughout Germany. All official Iranian facilities abroad, including embassies,
trade offices, cultural centers, airline offices, and even state companies are obliged to
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support the country's propaganda. 206 According to Peter Frisch, head of the BfV, any
conflict with an Islamic state "could be really dangerous" given that an estimated 31,000
Islamic extremists are part of Germany's 3 million-strong Muslim community.207 Frisch
also has said about 150 Hamas and 600 Hezbollah adherents live in Germany. They
support their partisans in Lebanon or Palestine against Israel. 208 The result is increased
caution in Germany's dealings with the Near and Middle East. Additionally, it has
contributed to Germany's interest in serving as a mediator between the Islamic world and
the West.
2. The Roles of the Major Policy Figures
Major German policy figures and officials involved in relations with Iran have
included Chancellor Kohl, his policy advisor Joachim Bitterlich, former Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Economics Giinter Rexrodt, former Minister of
Economics Jurgen Mollemann, and the manager of the German-Iranian Chamber of Trade,
Herbert Riedel.
In contrast to some areas of foreign policy, however, with a high involvement of
the chancellor's office, policy towards Iran has mainly been the domain of Foreign
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Minister Klaus Kinkel. 209 Kinkel, of the FDP, was instrumental behind the EU's adoption
of the policy of "critical dialogue," which was essentially an adaptation of Hans-Dietrich
Genscher's policy. Kinkel maintained the policy even when it was clearly not working,
leading to severe criticism in the German press. Moreover, despite evidence indicating
Iranian involvement in the September 1992 Mykonos murders, Kinkel continued to say
there was no evidence Iran supports terrorist activities as late 1995. 210
Prior to becoming Foreign Minister in May 1992, Kinkel was Justice Minister from
January 1991 to May 1992, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Justice from 1982
to 1991, and President of the BND from 1979 to 1982. He was chairman of the FDP
from 1993 to 1995.211 Despite the variety of prominent positions held prior to becoming
Foreign Minister, Kinkel lacks the prominence of his predecessor, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher. The result it that Klaus Kinkel has had to compete for influence against
officials like Kohl's advisor, Joachim Bitterlich.
Minister of State Bernd Schmidbauer also has played a prominent role in relations
with Iran. Schmidbauer, of the CDU, became Chancellor Kohl's intelligence service
coordinator in December 1991. Schmidbauer visited Tehran in 1992 and held discussions
with Iranian Minister of Information and Security, Ali Fallahian, in Bonn in October
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1993. 212 The visit was highly criticized, particularly after Fallahian announced that the
two countries' security agencies had cooperated for two years. This, it was later revealed,
consisted of organizational training and computers. 213 Schmidbauer defended the
discussions by saying they were related to narcotics, terrorism, and humanitarian purposes,
not so much to the benefit of German citizens as to the citizens of other countries. He did
admit that Fallahian requested his assistance to stop the Mykonos trial. The trial began
later that same month
Like Kinkel, Schmidbauer denied claims of official Iranian involvement in the
Mykonos killings. Further, he played down BfV reports that the Iranian embassy in Bonn
was the "center of the Iranian secret services" in Europe.214 Schmidbauer negotiated for
the release of Germans imprisoned in Iran, including Helmut Szimkus. He used contacts
in Lebanon to facilitate the exchange of prisoners and the bodies of soldiers between Israel
and Hezbollah. Schmidbauer also has served as a mediator in negotiations between
Iranian and Israeli diplomats. 215
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E. A POLICY OF SMALL STEPS
The Federal Republic's preference for constructive engagement can be traced to its
policies of the Cold War. Egon Bahr's concept of "change through rapprochement" as an
alternative to the Hallstein Doctrine and containment led to the policy of Ostpolitik under
Chancellor Willy Brandt after 1969. While Americans wanted to limit Eastern bloc access
to Western technology, to reduce Western dependence on energy resources from the East,
to restrict the availability of export credits, and to impose sanctions when deemed
necessary for leverage with the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic primarily utilized
economic policies for the pursuit of a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Trade with
the east was a fundamental component of Ostpolitik and it made the Federal Republic the
biggest trading partner with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This policy, based on
the use of positive inducements to promote change in the East, was practiced in various
forms until the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Consequently, many Germans attribute the end
of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany to the success of detente and Ostpolitik.
Given the view that these policies were so successful, the Federal Republic has
applied the same concepts in its extra-European foreign policy. The policy of "critical
dialogue" was an application of the principles of Ostpolitik to Iran. The policy operated
on the assumption that Iranian behavior could be influenced through communication
(discussions on human rights) and through incentives (commercial relations). Not long
after Germany and its EU partners adopted the policy of "critical dialogue, however,
German relations with Iran would confront a series of crises.
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IV. CRISES IN GERMAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS
The relationship between Germany and Iran has not been smooth. One crisis after
another has prevented the normalization of relations hoped for at the end of the 1980-
1988 Iran-Iraq War. These crises are significant because they demonstrate the problems
faced by German foreign policy in dealing with the regime in Tehran. The Federal
Republic's human rights priorities often have conflicted with its economic objectives. In
the past, concern for the safety of Germans held in Lebanon or in Iranian prisons also has
constrained Germany's willingness to respond to Iranian human rights violations.
Nevertheless, recent events reveal the limits of Germany's toleration for Iranian actions,
they demonstrate the delicate balance between Germany's relations with Iran and its
commitment to Israel, and they reveal the gradual deterioration in German-Iranian
relations that ultimately led to the suspension of "critical dialogue" in April 1997.
This chapter explores the following events: (a) Ayatollah Khomeyni's call to
murder British author Salman Rushdie in 1989; (b) the holding of German hostages in
Lebanon by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah until 1992; (c) the sentencing of a German citizen
to death in Iran in 1992; (d) the arrest of German citizens in Iran in 1992 and 1993; (e)
Iranian President Rafsanjani's comments concerning the assassination of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995; (f) the arrest of Iranian writer Faraj Sarkuhi in 1996; and
(g) the April 1997 Berlin court verdict implicating Iranian government officials in the
murder of Iranian Kurdish exiles. These incidents reveal how Germany has both benefited,
and been victimized, through its relations with Iran.
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A. SALMAN RUSHDIE
In February 1989, Ayatollah Khomeyni issued afatwa (religious edict) condemning
British author Salman Rushdie to death and calling for his assassination for writing the
novel The Satanic Verses. The book was considered offensive to Muslims. Khomeyni'
s
death threat was met by a firm response in the Federal Republic. Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher recalled the German charge d'affaires in Tehran, Thomas Troeml, back
to Bonn (the ambassador, Armin Freitag, was on leave). The Iranian ambassador in Bonn,
Mehdi Ahari-Mostafavi, was also summoned to the Foreign Ministry where the State
Secretary, Jurgen Sudhoff, condemned the threat to murder Rushdie. 216
Chancellor Helmut Kohl called on the "whole community of civilized nations" to
act against Iran's threat to murder Rushdie.217 The Bundestag strongly condemned the
threat. All major political parties called for measures against Iran. The CSU and Greens
demanded the termination of a German-Iranian cultural agreement concluded the previous
November. SPD called for use of all possibilities including economic pressure to persuade
Tehran to yield. However, a motion by the Greens calling for the termination of all
economic agreements with Iran was rejected.218
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The Foreign Ministry emphasized the requirement to address the fatwa against
Rushdie at the European level. 219 Following an EC foreign ministers' resolution to stop
high-ranking official meetings until the threat was rescinded, preparations were stopped
for a planned German-Iranian Economic Commission meeting in Tehran. 220 Bonn
temporarily suspended new credit talks. Genscher postponed the German-Iranian cultural
agreement. Agricultural Minister Ignaz Keichle called off a visit to Tehran planned for
May. Baden-Wurttemberg Economics Minister Martin Herzog canceled a delegation visit
to Iran planned for June. The Foreign Ministry indicated that respect for the fundamentals
of international law would be necessary for an improvement in relations. 221
Relations appeared to be improving by late September 1989 when Foreign
Minister Genscher met with Foreign Minister Velayati at the United Nations. Genscher
expressed optimism that relations could again take positive steps after Iranian President
Rafsanjani made a statement that in the future his country would respect the sovereignty
of all countries. 222 The suspension of high-level contacts did not effect steadily improving
commercial relations between Germany and Iran.
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In February 1993, three months after the EC's adoption of the policy of "critical
dialogue," Iran's supreme religious leader, Seyyed Ali Khamenei renewed the fatwa
against Salman Rushdie. In response, the German Foreign Ministry renewed its call for
Iran to rescind thefatwa and reaffirmed that Bonn's stand remained in alignment with the
EC.223 Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel pledged his support to Rushdie during a meeting
with the author in December 1993.224 The Bundestag also unanimously approved a
motion appealing to Iranian government to withdraw its death sentence. 225 Iranian
officials, however, continued to say the fatwa could not be altered.226 Foreign Minister
Velayati pointed out that, to the Iranian way of thinking, fatwa is tantamount to a divine
law and therefore cannot be rescinded.
The fatwa against Salman Rushdie was the first crisis in German-Iranian relations
after the end of the Iran-Iraq War. While it setback closer cultural and political
cooperation, it did not affect economic ties. German-Iranian trade increased steadily from
1989 to 1992. Moreover, the Federal Republic's reaction to the death threat had to take
into account the fact that Iran was mediating for the release of German hostages in
Lebanon.
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B. LEBANON HOSTAGES
Germans citizens were among the Western hostages held in Lebanon until the early
1990s. All were held by pro-Iranian Hezbollah who apparently intended to use the
abductions to obtain the release of the Hamadah brothers, Ali Abbas and Muhammad.
The brothers were arrested in Germany and later sentenced to life and 13 years
imprisonment, respectively, for murder, hostage taking, and hijacking a TWA airliner from
Athens to Beirut in 1985. Muhammad Hamadah was responsible for the murder of U.S.
Navy diver Robert Stetham on the hijacked TWA flight.
Hoechst manager Rudolf Cordes and Siemens technician Alfred Schmidt were
kidnapped in January 1987, the same month Ali Abbas Hamadah was arrested in
Frankfurt. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher requested Iranian help to
secure their release. 227 Iranian intermediaries were involved almost from the beginning. 228
The Germans made it clear, partly due to American pressure, that they would not trade the
Hamadah brothers for the German hostages. Alfred Schmidt was released by January
1988. Rudolf Cordes was released in September 1988.
Thomas Kemptner and Heinrich Struebig were abducted in May 1989. Again the
Hamadah family was reportedly responsible, and willing to release the Germans only on
the condition that both its sons in German prisons were released. In August 1991, the
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Iranian ambassador, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian, irritated Bonn and was consequently
summoned to the Foreign Ministry after claiming that Iran "knew the family well" and
calling for a pardon for the Hamadah brothers 229 The Germans made it clear that they
were not willing to make any concessions. Struebig and Kemptner were finally released in
Beirut in June 1992.
Hostage mediation efforts opened new lines of communication between Germany
and Iran. Bonn later used its contacts in Tehran to mediate between Israel and Hezbollah.
However, German-Iranian relations remained strained over human rights issues, including
the sentencing to death of a German citizen in Tehran.
C. HELMUT SZTMKUS
The German government was informed of the arrest of Helmut Szimkus on
charges of espionage in early 1989. Iran accused the German engineer of having been an
agent for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. It was also claimed that Szimkus had spied on
targets for Iraqi missiles with the knowledge of and support from German diplomats. A
trial began in April 1991. In January 1992, Szimkus allegedly admitted to his offense and
was sentenced to death.
In January 1992, Klaus Kinkel, who was then federal justice minister, visited
Szimkus in Evin Prison in Tehran. Szimkus appeared to have been tortured. Kinkel
threatened grave consequences if Szimkus was executed. Additionally, the Foreign
229
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Ministry made it absolutely clear that Bonn diplomats were not involved in the alleged
espionage case. 230
In negotiations between Bonn and Tehran, the Iranians indicated that the death
sentence could possibly be converted into a prison sentence. A prerequisite, however, was
that the Szimkus case could not appear in the headlines of any newspapers. 231 Bonn was
assured Szimkus' sentence would be commuted until the Iranian supreme court confirmed
the death sentence in April 1993. That same month, during a visit to Bonn by Iranian
Deputy Majlis President Hasan Rowhani, Klaus Kinkel pointed out that the execution of
Szimkus would place a serious strain on German-Iranian relations.232 In January 1994,
during a visit to Bonn by Muhammad Larijani, secretary of the International Relations
Committee of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security, Kinkel again appealed to Iran
to pardon Szimkus. 233 Minister of State Bernd Schmidbauer was promised that the death
sentence would be commuted to a prison sentence in February 1994. 234 Szimkus was
pardoned and set free in July 1994.
230
"Foreign Ministry Rejects Iranian Espionage Charges," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 3 February 1993, p. 7,
FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-93-022, 4 February 1993, p. 17.
231 Ibid.
232
"Grateful for Life Term," FOCUS, 10 January 1994, p. 14., FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-94-007,
"Kinkel Comments on Iranian Relations," 11 January 1994, p. 21.
233
"Kinkel Urges Iran to Pardon German Citizen," Berlin DDP/ADN, 1544 GMT 14 January 1994,
FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-94-011, 18 January 1994, p. 18.
234
"Iranian Death Sentence on German Commuted," Berlin DDP/ADN, 1302 GMT, 26 February 1994,
FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-94-039, 28 February 1994, p. 28.
87
D. FERSCH AND BACHMANN
Building contractor Paul-Dietrich Fersch was imprisoned in Tehran allegedly for
fraud, insulting Khomeyni pictures, and espionage in August 1992. Following intervention
by Bernd Schmidbauer, Fersch was released from an Iranian prison and allowed to return
to Germany in October 1 993
.
Gerhard Bachmann was arrested in October 1993. Bachmann, considered one of
the most respected members of the German community in Iran, was charged with
unauthorized contact with the Iranian army, bribery, and espionage. 235 Foreign Minister
Kinkel summoned the Iranian ambassador, Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian, to the Foreign
Ministry to protest the arrest. 236 Bachmann was released one month later in November
1993.
E. RAFSANJANI STATEMENTS
Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani called the assassination of Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin "a divine revenge" in November 1995. In reaction, Foreign
Minister Kinkel recalled the German ambassador, sent a letter of complaint to the Iranian
government, and summoned the Iranian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry to protest the
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statement. 237 Nevertheless, Kinkel still continued with plans for Iranian Foreign Minister
Velayati to attend a two-day Islamic conference scheduled the following week in Bonn.
Kinkel's decision not to withdraw the invitation was severely criticized by the
Bundestag where a resolution was passed calling for Bonn to cancel Velayati 's invitation.
Kinkel, after holding crisis talks with the coalition parties, postponed the Islamic
conference altogether. 238 The policy of "critical dialogue" came under increasing fire and
led to speculation that Kinkel would resign. Nevertheless, Kinkel defended the policy. He
said the talks were being used to try to bring Tehran into the Middle East peace process,
to build at least limited agreement over human rights questions, to aid individual cases of
people in trouble in Iran, and as a means to oppose Iranian support for terrorist groups. 239
Subsequently, however, following Iran's approval of the series of suicide bombings in
Israel in February-March 1996 by Islamists which killed 60 people, it was declared that
any evidence of Iranian involvement in or support for the bombing campaign in Israel
would force Germany to reconsider its relations with Iran.240
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F. FARAJ SARKUHI
Faraj Sarkuhi, editor of the literary journal Adineh, was one of 134 writers who
signed a petition in October 1994 calling for freedom of expression. 241 He was first
arrested at the apartment of Jens Gust, the German cultural attache in Tehran, in July
1996. During the arrest, the Gust was locked in a room for over an hour, interrogated,
and all his private files and documents searched. 242 Sarkuhi was released but arrested
again on 3 November 1996 as he prepared to fly to Germany, where his wife and children
live. Sarkuhi did not reappear for six weeks. At the end of January, the newspaper Die
Tageszeitung published a letter from the writer smuggled out of Iran which said he had
been detained in Tehran by the Iranian intelligence services until 20 December, and as a
result of torture, confessed that he is a German spy. 243 On 20 December, Sarkuhi,
looking distraught, announced at a state-organized press conference that he had been in
Germany since November.244 He was arrested again in during another attempt to leave
the country in February. A trial for Sarkuhi, on charges of spying for Germany and trying
to leave the country illegally, was announced in June. 245 The trial was to be held in secret.
241
"Iran: Law Versus Pen," The Economist, 28 June 1997, p. 42.
242
"End of the Sound of Shawms," Der Spiegel, 2 September 1996, pp. 22-25, FBIS West Europe, FBIS-
WEU-96-171, 2 September 1996.
243
"Atmosphere of Fear," Der Spiegel, 30 December 1996, pp. 104-107, FBIS West Europe, FBIS-
WEU-97-014, 30 December 1996.
244
"Iran: Law Versus Pen," The Economist, 28 June 1997, pp. 42-44.
245
"T,-jai of Iranian Writer Sarkuhi to Be Held Soon," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 31 May-1 June 1997, p. 1,
FBIS West Europe, FBIS-WEU-97-153, 2 June 1997.
90
Occurring at a time of strained relations, the arrest of Faraj Sarkuhi received
significant attention in Germany. Foreign Minister Kinkel called the editor's trial an
obstacle to Bonn-Tehran relations. 246 While Sarkuhi 's arrest was clearly intended to
silence Iranian critics of the regime in Tehran, the charges of espionage were designed to
exert pressure on Germany as a result of the Mykonos trial.
G. MYKONOS ASSASSINATION
The greatest crisis in German-Iranian relations since the fatwa against Salman
Rushdie began with the assassination of Iranian Kurdish opposition leader Sadegh
Sharafkandi, two associates, and a translator at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin on 17
September 1992. The victims, members of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, had
been in Berlin to attend the Socialist International Congress.
A large-scale investigation initiated by the Federal Office of Criminal
Investigations (BKA) and the prosecutor general's office led to the arrest of one Iranian
and four Lebanese. According to the BfV, Kazem Darabi, the Iranian suspected of
organizing the attack, worked for the Iranian intelligence service VEVAK.247 As
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investigations continued, it became increasingly apparent the group had received guidance
from agents in the Iranian embassy in Bonn. 248
The suspects were charged with murder in May 1993. High security court
proceedings opened in October 1993. The investigation, concluded in January 1996, led
to an arrest warrant in March 1996 for Iranian Minister of Information and Security Ali
Fallahian, who the public prosecutors office was convinced was the wire-puller behind the
murders. Despite the arrest warrant, the Kohl government continued to assert that
"critical dialogue" would not be reconsidered.
The German press became increasingly critical of the government
—
particularly
Klaus Kinkel and Bernd Schmidbauer—for promoting ties with Iran while ignoring
German security agencies' warnings of Iranian involvement in terrorism, even within
Germany itself.249 In April 1996, Kinkel listed five policy goals for Iran which would
serve as "surveying posts" for further development of relations. These goals included
support for the Middle East peace process, recognition of the elected Palestinian
authority, a public view of no financial or military support for extremists; and efforts to
moderate the behavior of Hezbollah.250
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Iranian authorities repeatedly sought to influence the course of the trial, and in the
run up to the verdict they reportedly made clear they would not tolerate any direct naming
by the judge of spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei or President Rafsanjani. However, at
the conclusion of a three-year trial in November 1996, a German federal prosecutor
accused top Iranian officials of planning the Mykonos murder. Prosecutors also
demanded life sentences for Kazem Darabi and a Lebanese suspect. The accusations
triggered demonstrations outside the German embassy in Tehran.
Chancellor Kohl sent a letter to President Rafsanjani saying Germany was not
responsible for the actions of its independent judiciary. In the letter, Kohl said Germany
was interested in the continuation of friendly relations between the two countries.251
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel responded to developments in Iran with an appeal for
prudence to ease tensions between Bonn and Tehran. Breaking off diplomatic relations,
he argued, would be a mistake. As for calls from German politicians that he abandon the
term "critical dialogue" to describe German-Iranian relations, Kinkel said the expression
had taken on too heavy a symbolic meaning. Germany, he continued, wanted to pursue a
policy of "active influence" ("aktive Einwirkung") towards Iran in the belief that it is
better to maintain contact with Iran than force it into a corner. 252
On 10 April 1997, the Berlin court declared its verdict. Judge Frithjof Kubsch
backed the prosecution's contention that the five defendants acted on orders from Iran's
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Committee of Special Affairs, whose members include (by implication, though not by
name) spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei, President Rafsanjani, and Minister of
Information and Security Fallahian.253 The judgment was the first time a court in Europe
had directly implicated Iranian leaders in terrorist acts abroad. The court ruled that
Iranian Kazem Darabi masterminded the Mykonos restaurant killing and sentenced him to
life imprisonment. One Lebanese defendant received a life sentence. He was accused of
being a former pro-Iranian Hezbollah terrorist who had undergone paramilitary training in
Iran and carried out the killings with Darabi. Two other defendants received a eleven-year
sentence and a five years and three months sentence. They allegedly helped with bribes
and fake passports. The fifth defendant was acquitted. Germany immediately recalled its
ambassador in Tehran, Horst Baechmann, for consultations and expelled four Iranian
diplomats. Bonn also suspended the policy of "critical dialogue." On 11 April, the other
EU countries except Greece ordered their ambassadors back from Tehran.
Iran recalled its ambassadors from all EU countries except Greece and called off a
planned high-level trade delegation to Germany. Hasan Rowhani, deputy speaker of
Iran's parliament, called for suspending all Iranian investments in Germany and banning
purchases of German equipment. 254 Iran also threatened to bring to trial German
companies which supplied equipment to Iraq for making poison gas during the Iran-Iraq
War. The Iranian parliament held a closed door session to review relations with
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Germany. 255 President Rafsanjani denounced the Berlin verdict and warned that Bonn
stood to lose its privileged position with Iran. 256 Although, German and Iranian officials
worked behind the scenes to prevent the damage from going further, the turnout of over
100,000 demonstrators outside the German embassy in Tehran made the issue increasingly
difficult to control. 257 The safety of the 530 Germans living in Tehran became a major
concern. 258 There was also concern that protests could get out of control and lead to a
storming of the German embassy or that the Lufthansa airline could be the target of an
attack.
On 1 2 April, Klaus Kinkel told Welt am Sontag that the "participation in the armed
attack on the Mykonos restaurant by Iranian state organizations, which was established"
by the Berlin court, is "a blatant violation of international law." This will have
"consequences for Germany's foreign policy." A "reevaluation" of German and European
Iran policy "is necessary now."259
On 1 7 April, during the Bundestag debate on policy towards Iran, Kinkel stressed
his priorities in a speech:
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We must not break off all contact with Iran, not least because we on our
part have clear demands to make. These include in particular respect for
human rights. We shall continue to press for Salman Rushdie's safety as
well as justice for the Iranian author Sarkuhi. We shall continue to stand
up for the rights of religious minorities, especially the Baha'i community.
We shall continue to work for a change in Iran's attitude to the Middle
East peace process. We shall insist that Iran stop all threats and activities
directed against Iranian dissidents abroad, their lives and persons....
. . . The people of Germany and Iran are linked by a century-old tradition of
good relations. Large numbers of Iranians have studied in Germany, many
now occupy positions of responsibility and continue to feel an affinity for
us. There have been and still are excellent contacts at the university level.
These are all factors to be considered when deciding on the future course
of our relations with Iran. What has been built up over these long years
should even in stormy weather not be demolished wholesale. Particularly
with a view also to those who do not back the Tehran regime, we must
continue our steadfast efforts to bring about an improvement in those
aspects of Iran's conduct which give rise to concern and criticism.
Any evaluation of our relations with Iran must also take into account the
undeniable successes of German and European efforts:




Iran has agreed to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Iran is cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In Lebanon, German and other Western hostages have been released,
thanks to good Iranian offices.
We have been successful in our mediation efforts between Hezbollah
and Israel.
Helmut Szimkus, a German national held in Iran under the sentence of
death, has been pardoned and set free.
We have obtained the freedom of German nationals Fersch, Schlax and
Bachmann, who were being held in Iran.
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• Iran has resumed cooperation with the Special Rapporteurs for human
rights, religious tolerance and freedom of opinion, who visited Iran in
1996.
We must avoid any action that might strengthen the radical forces in the
country. After all, a German and European policy conceived for the long
term cannot ignore the fact that Iran is a major player in the region. Its
geostrategic situation means it holds a key position in security matters.
Without or even against Iran no policy in the region can be successful in
the long term. Long-term stability can only be achieved if Iran can be
persuaded to adopt a policy of moderation. That is important, particularly
in the light of our concern over the continuing arms build-up in the region.
We take the view, as do all our European partners, that it is vital for us to
continue to be able to influence Iran and not opt for a policy of isolation,
which leads to nowhere. That has been and will continue to be our
approach....260
Though Kinkel had suspended the policy of "critical dialogue" only one week earlier, he
made it clear that the basic principles of the policy should continue.
The Bundestag passed a resolution calling on Iran to observe international law,
end support for international terrorism, respect human rights, and "refrain from hunting
down opponents living abroad."261 However, it imposed no punitive measures. The
resolution passed on the strength of Chancellor Kohl's majority. Opposition parties voted
against it because they wanted to include specific punitive measures. 262 Kinkel stopped
short of breaking off diplomatic or economic ties with Iran.
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On 29 April, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, agreed
to send ambassadors back to Tehran. They extended the suspension of "critical dialogue,"
but refused to abandon the policy completely, insisting it serves its purpose. 263 The
foreign ministers included the following points in their declaration on Iran:
• confirmation that under the present circumstances there is no basis for
the continuation of the Critical Dialogue between the European Union
and Iran;
• the suspension of official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran;
• confirmation of the established policy of the European Union member
states not to supply arms to Iran;
• cooperation to ensure visas are not granted to Iranians with intelligence
and security functions;
• concertation in excluding Iranian intelligence personnel from European
Union member states
The Council decided to keep the relationship with Iran under close review
and instructed the Political Committee accordingly. Member states will
instruct their Ambassadors, after their return to Teheran, to contribute in a
coordinated way to the continual appraisal by the Council of the
relationship....264
The EU foreign ministers decided against economic sanctions. Consequently, the only real
change was the suspension of ministerial visits. Further, the decision to extend the
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suspension of "critical dialogue" was not expected to have much impact. In reality, the
policy only amounted to 3-4 hours of talks between senior diplomats every six months. 265
Initially, the only significant impact on relations was the postponement of the high-
level Iranian trade delegation to Germany in late April. However, before EU ambassadors
could return to Tehran, Ayatollah Khamenei ordered the Foreign Ministry not to allow the
German or Danish ambassadors back "for a period of time."266 "We are even more than
happy if the German ambassador, in particular, does not return," claimed Foreign Minister
Velayati. Iran also said it would not rush its ambassadors back to Europe. Iran later said
the EU ambassadors could come back, but demanded that the German ambassador return
last. Out of solidarity with Germany, the EU reversed its earlier decision. EU
ambassadors would not return to Tehran until they were allowed to return together.
On 4 August, a moderate cleric, Muhammad Khatami, was sworn in as president
of Iran, signaling a potential new era in Tehran's foreign relations. Khatami, who headed
the Islamic Center in Hamburg from 1978-1980, speaks fluent German, and sees himself
as a mediator between cultures, was optimistic that German ties with Iran could
improve. 267 The new foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, expressed a willingness to talk
with EU foreign ministers, including Klaus Kinkel. However, a few days after Khatami,
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took office, a partial boycott of German companies was reported. 268 Herbert Riedel,
managing director of the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce confirmed that the
Iranian Trade and Industry Ministry was pursuing a boycott of German products. Iran
would approve only the imports that it absolutely needs and cannot get elsewhere. 269
On 26 August, Germany said it wanted to improve relations with Iran. "After a
long pause for thought... we want to slowly reestablish contacts with Iran," said
Kinkel. 270 However, Kinkel added that Iran had to clarify issues such as whether it would
observe international law, its position in the Middle East peace process, and the return of
EU envoys. The following day, on 27 August, Chancellor Kohl welcomed what he
described as noticeable political changes brought by the new government in Iran.271 Kohl
said that signals from Iran's new government must be watched closely to see if relations
between Tehran and the EU can be improved.272
The EU's attempts to find a solution for the return of ambassadors remained
unsuccessful through September and October. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
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continued to insist that the German ambassador must be the last ambassador to return.273
In November, officials finally reached a compromise solution. Iran agreed to allow the
ambassadors to return in two groups, with the German and French ambassadors arriving
together in the second group. 274 The first group returned to Tehran on 14 November.
The German and French ambassadors returned to Tehran on 22 November.275
H. TEST OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
During the 1990s, Iran has served as a test case for the Federal Republic's
constructive engagement policy. In December 1992, the EU's adoption of "critical
dialogue" followed the release in the previous June of the last German hostages from
Lebanon. Iran's role in securing their release was seen as proof that relations could be
beneficial even if the Rushdie affair remained unresolved. The opportunity to negotiate
for the release of Paul-Dietrich Fersch and Gerhard Bachmann in 1993, and secure a
pardon for Helmut Szimkus in 1994, were seen as additional benefits. However, the
ongoing Mykonos investigation and trial, official Iranian comments regarding Rabin's
assassination and terrorist activity in Israel, followed by the issuance of an arrest warrant
for Fallahian, led to a deterioration of relations. Despite an increased willingness to
criticize Iran, incidents like the arrest of Faraj Sarkuhi made a modification in German
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policy inevitable even before the April 1997 Mykonos verdict. Nevertheless, as events
after the suspension of "critical dialogue" demonstrate, Germany continues to adhere to
the principles of constructive engagement.
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V. CONCLUSION
After the Mykonos verdict on 10 April 1997, the Federal Republic did not impose
economic sanctions on Iran. Moreover, on 29 April, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
agreed to send the German ambassador back to Tehran. While the actual return of the
ambassador was delayed seven months until November, this was only due to Iran's
insistence that the German ambassador return last. The Germans wanted their ambassador
to return sooner, but the Iranians would not back down.276
The Germans avoided the imposition of sanctions and decided to send their
ambassador back at the first opportunity for two key reasons: First, it is widely believed
in Germany that a policy of cooperation and engagement is the most effective way to exert
influence on another country's actions. Second, the Germans view the economic and
political costs of sanctions to be unacceptably excessive.
A. LEGACY OF OSTPOLITIK
The policy of "critical dialogue" remains officially suspended. Yet, the Germans
will resume a new policy of constructive engagement with Iran even if they no longer use
the term "critical dialogue." The Federal Republic's extra-European policy sets the
context for its Iran policy. The preference for diplomatic engagement and economic
cooperation has its origins in Egon Bahr's 1963 idea of a policy of "small steps" leading to
276
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a "change through rapprochement." Bahr's concept of detente developed into the policy
of Ostpolitik under Chancellor Willy Brandt after 1969. The basic concepts of the
Ostpolitik continued under the center-left government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and
the center-right coalition under Chancellor Kohl. Consequently, the German perception
that Ostpolitik led to the successful collapse of the Eastern bloc, the end of the Cold War,
and ultimately the unification of Germany has fostered its adoption in other theaters of
policy, most notably Iran.
In late 1997, one justification for sending back the ambassador to Tehran and
restoring full diplomatic relations with Iran was that the new president, Muhammad
Khatami, is a moderate and worthy of support. In 1980, Chancellor Schmidt and Foreign
Minister Genscher used the policy of constructive engagement as justification for their
opposition to economic sanctions to pressure Iran to release the American hostages. They
argued that President Bani-Sadr was a moderate whom one should not abandon.
Likewise, in 1989, the election of President Rafsanjani was seen as a positive step and a
justification for improving ties with Tehran despite Ayatollah Khomeyni's/a/wa against
Salman Rushdie. Constructive engagement is seen as advantageous for keeping open the
lines of communication to force the Iranian political elite to face issues unacceptable to the
West. The Germans believe this approach is stern, yet potentially accommodating, that it
can more likely generate cooperation from Iran, that it will not provoke Iran into
aggressive behavior, and that it can help strengthen moderate domestic elements in Iran
rather than their more radical counterparts.
104
B. SANCTIONS TOO COSTLY
Traditionally, the Federal Republic has opposed the use of sanctions. From the
German point of view, the political and economic costs of sanctions are unacceptably high.
Preferring "quiet diplomacy" and lacking the traditional political-military structure of other
powers, Germany favors economics as the means to attain its political objectives. It
interprets its security and the best strategy in economic terms. Power political demands
which might be suspect because of Germany's past are translated into more respectable
economic demands.
Sanctions would damage German credibility as a trading partner, a significant
factor in a country where 30 percent of the economy is devoted to exports, compared to
1 percent in the United States. This fact means that Germany must make sure its export
markets remain open and available to maintain its economy and possibly its political
stability. The country is therefore one the strongest proponents of free trade. To protect
its markets, Germany must demonstrate reliability—its products as well as their delivery.
Further, Germany cannot afford to write off its substantial loans to Iran. German trade
with Iran will probably remain low for the foreseeable future, but in the long run it will
improve. In the past, German business has done well in Iran because of its willingness to
stay when the firms of other countries have left the market. In 1980 to 1981, Germany
only hesitantly participated in the EC sanctions against Iran. However, by 1983, German
exports to Iran reached a new peak. In 1989, following thefatwa against Salman Rushdie,
sanctions were avoided and by 1992 trade with Iran set a record level. In 1997, German
trade with Iran may be down, but in the long-run it probably will pick up. Clearly, for
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Germany, the cost of its participation in economic sanctions would be the loss of
economic and political influence.
There are other factors behind German relations with Iran. The two countries
have a century's old friendship that has only been interrupted by pressure from outside
powers—Britain and Russia—in the First and Second World Wars. German foreign and
security policy considers Iran a strategically important country and far too significant to
isolate. It offers access to the potential wealth of Central Asia and has the second largest
natural gas reserves in the world.
At the same time, Germany has a special commitment to Israel as a result of the
Second World War. This includes a commitment to the security of the Near and Middle
East. Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process, support for Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and support and encouragement for terrorism in Israel are all concerns of great
gravity. While Israel may complain in public about German-Iranian relations, Israel has
benefited from the relationship. Germany has mediated between Israel and Iran, thus
displaying its influence in the international system and perhaps the wisdom of its policies.
German foreign policy has to take account of long-term political considerations:
its central location in Europe, its economic dependence on exports, and finally, German
history. All this sets standards for the objectives, substance, and procedures of German
policy.
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The Federal Republic sees economic sanctions as futile. The only way it would
participate in sanctions is if they are imposed by the United Nations. Consequently, the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act will not succeed in coercing Germany into sanctions. While
the United States remains the Federal Republic's primary strategic partner, the United
States can no longer link issues to security to the extent that it did during the Cold War.
Further, Germany sees itself being asked to make a greater sacrifice than the United States
is willing to pay.
While Germany has a different policy for dealing with Iran, it does have the same
objectives: to stop Iran from supporting terrorism and disrupting the Middle East peace
process, and to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular,
nuclear weapons. German officials like to argue that the difference with the United States
is only one of tactics. However, that is not an insignificant difference. Different tactics
often yield different short- and long-term consequences.
The fact that American and German policy objectives towards Iran are so similar
offers a starting point for coordination. The United States and Germany should agree on
common measures for tracking Iranian progress on those objectives. Recent events have
created an opportunity to find common ground in dealing with Iran. The Mykonos verdict
has increased Germany's caution in dealing with Iran. Iranian President Khatami has
expressed a willingness to begin dialogue with the United States. Iran needs the West. By
coordinating policy efforts, the United States and Germany, in the context of the EU,
would have more leverage for dealing with Tehran. The alternative is to risk further
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divergence between Germany and the United States over Iran policy. This only benefits
the individuals who view the United States as hostile to Iran.
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